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Abstract
Nicoletti and Scarpetta look at differences in the scope  hinder the n--  rtion of existing technologies,  possibly by
and depth of pro-competitive  regulatory  reforms and  reducing cunipetitive  pressures,  technology spillovers,  or
privatization  policies as a possible source of cross-  the entry of new high-technology  firms. At the same
country dispersion in growth ouf ,  I  es  They suggest  time, both privatization  and entry liberalization  are
that, despite  extensive liberalization  and privatization  in  estimated to  have a positive impact on productivity  in all
the OECD area,  the cross-country  variation  of regulatory  sectors.
settings has increased  in recent  years,  lining up with the  These results offer an interpretation  to the observed
increasing dispersion in growth.  The authors then  recent differences  in growth patterns across  OECD
investigate  empirically  the regulation-growth  link using  countries, in particular between  large continental
data that cover a large set of manufacturing  and service  European  economies and  the United States. Strict
industries  in OECD countries  over the past two decades  product market  regulations-and lack of regulatory
and focusing  on multifactor  productivity (MFP), which  reforms-are  likely to underlie the relatively  poorer
plays a crucial  role in GDP growth and accounts  for a  productivity performance  of some  European countries,
significant share of its cross-country  variance.  Regressing  especially  in those  industries where  Europe has
MFP on both economywide  indicators of regulation  and  accumulated  a technology  gap  (such as information and
privatization  and  industry-level  indicators of entry  communication technology-related  industries).  These
liberalization,  the authors find evidence  that reforms  results also  offer useful  insights for non-OECD  countries.
promoting  private governance  and competition  (where  In particular,  they point to the  potential benefits of
these are viable)  tend to boost productivity.  In  regulatory  reforms and privatization,  especially  in those
manufacturing  the gains to be expected  from lower entry  countries with large  technology  gaps and strict regulatory
barriers are  greater the further  a given country is from  settings that curb incentives to adopt new technologies.
the technology  leader.  So, regulation  limiting entry may
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One of the most striking economic  facts  in the OECD  area is the considerable  dispersion of
growth  rates  observed  in  the  past  decade,  when  some  countries  (most  notably  the  United
States) have pulled  ahead  in terms of output and productivity growth,  while others (e.g.  large
Continental  European  economies)  have  lagged  behind.  This  has  reversed  a  long-standing
process of convergence  in  living  standards  and  productivity  levels  and  is  at  odds with  both
underlying market  forces  that  have  led  to increasing  economic  integration  and  a  generalised
move towards sound macroeconomic  policy settings.
What  determined  these  marked  differences  in  growth  outcomes?  It  is  natural  to  seek
explanations  where  OECD  economies  are  likely  to  differ  most,  namely  their  institutional
environment  and  product and  labour  market policies affecting  entrepreneurial  choices. These
factors  may have  played  a  particularly  important  role  in  the  past decade  when  growth  was
associated  with the spread of information and communication  technology (ICT),  and the latter
has arguably been boosted  by the entry of new, innovative  firms in most markets as well as by
technology adoption of incumbent  firms. While differences  in  labour market arrangements  on
the two sides of the ocean have often  been emphasized,  product market conditions are  likely to
have had  a more direct bearing  on  growth.  Product  market  institutions and  policies  affect  in
important  ways  firm  governance  structures,  including  public  vs  private  ownership,
entrepreneurial  incentives,  and market access. In turn, good  governance, strong incentives  and
competitive pressures are likely to encourage  productivity improvements and  innovation.
Institutions,  policies and  ownership  structures  have  changed  a  lot over the past decades,  as
most OECD countries (as well as many non-OECD  countries)  implemented a wave of product
market  reforms  aimed  at  making  the  regulatory  environment  friendlier  to  competition  and
reduce the  role of public  enterprises  through  large-scale  privatisation.  However,  both  initial
conditions and the  pace of reform have differed  widely across countries,  leading to persistent
differences  in  the  product  market  environment.  Moreover,  the  effects  of these  reforms  on
economic  outcomes  are  still  a  matter  of controversy.  Were  they  successful  in  increasing
competitive  pressures?  Did  privatisation  actually affect  governance?  And,  if so,  did  stronger
competition  and  private  ownership  improve  overall  productivity  outcomes?  The  empirical
studies that explored the  linkage  between  ownership structures,  competition  and productivity
often  focused  on  specific  industries  or panels  of firms  (e.g. D'Souza  and  Megginson,  1999;
McKinsey,  1997;  Nickell,  1996).  While  this  allows  controlling  for  the  specific  market
conditions  in  which  business  decisions  are  taken,  it  precludes  the  analysis  of  the
economy-wide  growth  implications  because  general  equilibrium  effects  that  depend  on
cross-sectoral  linkages  and  adjustment  potential  of each  economy  are  ignored  (for example,
OECD,  1997a,  1997b,  highlights such linkages).
Can changes  in ownership structures and competitive pressures  faced by firms at the national
and  industry  levels  help to  explain  differences  in  MFP  growth  outcomes?  In this  paper,  we
address this issue exploring the  links between  productivity performance  and privatisation  and
regulatory  reform  policies.  A  distinctive  feature of our analysis  is  that we do  not attempt to
measure  directly  the degree  of entrepreneurial  incentives  and  competition  at the  industry or
2nation-wide  levels,  a  task  fraught  with  conceptual  and  empirical  shortcomings,  but  focus
instead on their policy determinants:  product  market regulations that affect the ability of firms
to enter markets (e.g. by creating fixed costs) or compete effectively with other firms (e.g.  by
distorting market mechanisms)  and the degree of public ownership of business enterprises.  We
first decribe these  policy patterns  by means of an original  set of indicators of product  market
regulation  and  public  ownership,  checking  whether  convergence  in  policies  has  occurred  in
recent  years.  We  show  that,  while  on  average  the  OECD  area  has  become  more  market-
friendly,  the dispersion  in regulatory settings has  increased.  We then investigate the impact of
privatisation and  liberalisation policies on growth  focusing on multifactor productivity  (MFP),
which  plays  a crucial  role  in GDP  growth  and  accounts  for  a high share of its  cross-country
variance.  We then estimate the effects  of these  policies  on the  level of MFP and the speed of
its  convergence  to best practice,  defined  as  the highest  level  of MFP  reached  in  each of the
industries  covered  by  the  analysis.  To  this  end,  we  use  data  covering  a  large  set  of
manufacturing  and service  industries  in several OECD countries over the past two decades.
In  the rest  of this section,  we  summarise  the stylised  facts  to be  explained  and  our major
findings.  In  Section  2,  we  highlight  the  channels  through  which  ownership  structures  and
barriers  to  competition  may  affect  MFP  outcomes,  drawing  on  the  existing  literature.  In
Section  3,  we  illustrate how barriers  to competition  ahd the  degree of public ownership  vary
across  countries  and  over  time,  explaining  how  we  measure  these  patterns  for  empirical
purposes.  In Section  4, we describe our empirical  approach  and present our empirical  results.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
1.1  Growth patterns
There has been  a renewed  interest  in economic growth  in recent years,  largely motivated  by
a  widespread  perception  of  diverging  growth  patterns  in  OECD  countries.  A  simple
comparison  of average (cyclically-adjusted)  growth  rates and their main  determinants  largely
confirms this perception  (Table  1).  While GDP growth  in the business  sector2 has accelerated
in  the  United  States  and  Canada  and  a  number of smaller  countries,  it has  slowed  down  in
Europe  (defined  as  EU15) and Japan.  The European  growth  patterns  are largely the result of
poor growth  performance  of the  largest economies,  while some (mainly small)  countries  have
shown clear signs of acceleration  in growth. The table also shows how these different  growth
patterns  have  come  about.  Labour  productivity  growth  accounts  for at  least  half of GDP
growth  in  most  OECD  countries,  providing  a  much  larger  contribution  in  many  of them.
Notwithstanding  differences  in  labour  productivity  growth  rates  across  countries,  it  is
noticeable  that  the  overall  dispersion  did  not  increase  in  the  1990s  as  compared  with  the
1980s,  despite the significant  widening  in the  variance of GDP growth  rates.  A key factor  to
reconcile  growing  disparities  in GDP per capita  growth rates  in the context of broadly stable
differences  in  labour  productivity  growth  is  the  divergence  in  patterns  of  labour  input
(employment  plus hours).  Significant  increases  in labour  input  in Ireland,  the Netherlands  (in
both  cases,  the  decline  in  hours  worked  was  more  than  compensated  by  the  increase  in
employment),  Spain and the United  States contrast  sharply with slumps in Japan,  and in most
large European countries.
[Table  1.  Determinants of GDP growth in OECD countries,  1980 - 2000]
2  In  our analysis, we exclude community, personal  and social services because of the poor quality of data
3The table also illustrates significant differences  in the drivers of labour productivity.  In most
European  countries,  high  (or  even  rising)  growth  rates  of labour  productivity  have  been
achieved by a marked process of capital  deepening.  Given the poor employment performance,
this  was  largely due  to substitution of labour  with capital  rather than to strong  investment  in
physical  capital.  In  contrast,  labour  productivity  has  been  driven  by  a  combination  of
employment-friendly  capital deepening  and growth  in MFP (a proxy for technical  progress) in
the United States, Australia,  Ireland,  Canada and Norway. These are the countries  where most
of the drivers of growth  have improved, leading to acceleration  in overall GDP growth.3
Box 1. Using multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth as a proxy for technological  progress
Estimates  of multifactor  productivity  (MFP)  growth  are often  used to  proxy  technological
progress.  They are obtained as the  residual  output growth  once the weighted  contributions of
changes  in  capital  and  labour  inputs  are  accounted  for.  Therefore,  MFP  growth  estimates
involve a number of assumptions  concerning the measurement  of output and inputs.
First, given  data  limitation, we used total  hours  worked  as the measure of labour input  and
the total capital stock as the measure of the capital input,  i.e. no control was made for changes
in  the  skill  composition  of the  workforce  of for  changes  in  the  composition  of the  capital
stock.  Arguably  these  MFP  growth  estimates  reflect  both  disembodied  and  embodied
components  bf technological  progress.  The  disembodied  component  captures  technological
and organisational  improvements  that  increase  output  for a given  amount  of--  quality and
compositionally  adjusted -- inputs.  However,  we  also  wanted  to  assess  the  extent  to  which
improvements  in  the  quality  of labour  and  capital  boosted  productivity  in  industries  and
countries  that  have  invested  in  them.  This  second  component  of technological  progress  is
termed  embodied and proxies  for the improvements  in the productive  capacity due to shifts to
higher quality factor inputs. (see also  Greenwood et al. 1997, Hercowitz,  1998).
Second,  the weights  of factor  inputs in  the calculation  of the MFP growth  residual  should
correspond  to the marginal productivity of labour and capital. These are not observable and we
followed  the  standard  procedure  of proxing them  with  income  shares,  which  can  be  easily
computed  from  national  accounts.  This  corresponds  to  making  a  few  assumptions,  most
importantly  that the  product  and  input  markets  are  perfectly  competitive  and that  there  are
constant  returns to scale  (Morrison,  1999).  However,  we  recognise  that  elasticities  can  vary
significantly for reasons other than  measurement errors and use time varying  factor shares. For
a sensitivity  analysis  of the  MFP estimates  obtained  with  this  approach  and  those obtained
using  elasticities  estimated  econometrically,  see  Scarpetta et al. (2000).  Moreover,  Scarpetta
and  Tressel  (2002a)  present  a  sensitivity  analysis  in  which  the  industry-level  productivity
regressions use MFP estimates  that control  for quality  changes  in the labour input and for the
presence of price mark-ups over marginal costs.
Productivity  growth  has  also  differed  significantly  across  industries  within  each  country,
with  particular  industries  showing  spectacular  performance  (Table  2). While contributions  to
growth  over  the 1990s  vary across  manufacturing  and service  industries  in almost  all  OECD
countries,  the patterns  are very different on  the two sides of the ocean.  In the  United  States,
productivity  growth  has  been  primarily  driven  by  high-tech  manufacturing  industries  and
service  industries  with  a  low  skill  content  (e.g.  retail  trade  and  hotels  and  restaurants).  In
Europe  (and  Japan)  the  drivers  of  aggregate  manufacturing  productivity  growth  were
' From  these  findings, it emerges  that  labour productivity growth  may be  a misleading  proxy  for efficiency enhancement,  especially  in countries
where  it was sustained by skill biased employment patterns
4industries  with  low  or medium  level technologies,  while  productivity  growth  in  the service
industry was largely  driven  by relatively  high-skills  industries (e.g. telecommunications  and
finance). Given the close link between  productivity growth and technological  progress,  cross-
industry  differentials  are  partly  related  to  different  patterns  of  innovative  activity  and
adoption.  Especially  in  industries  that  produce  or  use  information  and  communication
technologies  (ICT),  innovation  and  adoption  are  often driven  by new entrants.  Differences  in
industry-specific  entry conditions  across countries  are likely to underlie  some of the variance
in  industry productivity  growth  rates observed  over the past two  decades  and  in the industry
specialisation  of countries.  At the same  time, capital deepening  in the face of labour market
conditions  adverse  to  the  creation  of  low-skilled  jobs  (e.g.  minimum  wages)  may  partly
explain  the different  sources of service  productivity growth  in  Europe  and the  United States.
The  wide  variance  of  productivity  growth  rates  across  industries  and  their  potential
dependence on  industry-specific  conditions (regulation,  skill content, etc.)  point, therefore,  to
the need to analyse  the determinants of productivity at the detailed industry  level.  It should  be
stressed at the outset, however,  that estimates of MFP are problematic for a number of service
industries,  especially  in  level terms,  because of the way  in which both output  and  inputs are
measured.5
[Table 2. Decomposition of labour productivity growth across industries]
1.2  Regulation  and growth
The main elements  of the sweeping product market  reforms  implemented  over the past two
decades  were  privatisation,  liberalisation  of  potentially  competitive  markets  and
pro-competitive  regulation  of natural  monopoly  markets.  Reformers  often argued  that these
reforms  would  improve  corporate  governance  and  increase  competitive  pressures,  enhancing
framework  conditions  for growth.  To  gauge whether  reforms  have  indeed affected  MFP and
growth  outcomes,  through  these  channels,  we  use  a  new  set  of cross-country  quantitative
indicators of regulatory reform  measuring regulation  in particular areas, industries  and overall.
These  indicators  measure  to  what  extent  competition  and  firm  choices  are  restricted  in
industries  and areas where there are  no a priori  reasons to expect  the government  to interfere
or where regulatory  goals could  plausibly be achieved  by less coercive means and all of them
range from 0 to 6 as policies become more restrictive of market mechanisms.6
Figure  1 summarises  the  various  dimensions  of regulation  into  a  single  policy  indicator,
which  is useful  to  highlight the general  patterns of reform  (see below  for details on how the
indicator was constructed).  The figure shows  the evolution of this indicator over the past two
decades.  It presents succinctly the distribution  of regulatory  approaches  in the OECD area and
in the  EU  in  selected years;  and  the chronologically juxtaposed  boxes reveal  the  time-series
aspects of the data,  in particular  the evolution  of the median and the variance of the regulatory
indicator. The figure suggests some  policy convergence  over the past two decades  in absolute
terms:  on  average,  policies  have become  increasingly  more  friendly to  market  mechanisms.
' Bassanini  and Scarpetta (2002)  discuss  the links  between  ICT investment  and productivity patterns  Scarpetta  et al  (2002)  analyse  the  role of
entry in overall productivity growth in different manufacturing  industries  Nicoletti et al  (2001)  provide cross-country  evidence on the  link between
entry regulations and industry specialsation
5  For some  service  Industries, output  volume  senes are  often based on an extrapolation of input measures,  which are  ikely to  generate a dos%nward
bias  Moreover,  for those  service  industnes  that are  heavy users  of ICT,  estimated  MFP  may  be particularly  problematic because  ICT capital is
adjusted, in some countries,  for quality changes (via  hedonic pnce deflators) but output measures are not
6 The indicators  have  no ambition to measure  the quality or the  effectiveness (e g in  terms  of ability  to achieve stated public policy goals) of the
cxisting regulatory environmcnt.
5However, mainly  due to differences  in  initial conditions  and in the pace of reform,  regulatory
policies diverged in relative terms, with a widening variance  of approaches  across countries in
the most  recent  period.  Paradoxically,  the  recent  divergence  in  policies  is widest  within the
EU,  despite  efforts  by the  European  Commission  to harmonise the  business  environment  in
the Single Market.
[Figure  1. Regulatory  reform]
Did  these  differences  in  policies  affect  MFP  outcomes?  Simple  bivariate  relationships
suggest  that  an  anti-competitive  regulatory  environment  and  delays  in  implementing  pro-
market reforms,  including  improved market access and state retrenchment,  are associated with
relatively poor MFP performances  (Figure 2).  Over the  past decade,  many countries  in which
product  market  regulations  remained  unfriendly  to  competition  (e.g.  with  relatively  high
values of the regulatory  indicator) failed to overturn the generalised productivity  slowdown of
the  1970s  and  1980s,  while  reforming  countries  often  experienced  a  significant  pick  up  in
MFP  growth.  The acceleration  in  MFP growth  is  negatively correlated  with  three economy-
wide  measures  of regulation  and  regulatory  reform  but,  unsurprisingly,  the  correlation  is
strongest  with  the  indicator of administrative  burdens,  which  represent  a  uniform  barrier to
entry for businesses  in most industries.
[Figure  2. Multifactor productivity  acceleration  and p?oduct market regulation]
This  bivariate  evidence  is  supported  by  the  industry-level  multivariate  empirical  results
presented  in  Section  4, which  focus  on public  ownership and barriers to entry in  competitive
industries  and (competitive  segments  of)  network  industries,  the  main  source  of variance  in
OECD  regulatory  settings.  Regression  estimates  suggest  that  countries  in  which  public
ownership in the business sector is limited and barriers to entry are low are more successful  at
improving  MFP than  countries  in which  regulations  curb competition  and  public  enterprises
are  widespread.  Regulations  limiting  private  governance  and  competition  (where  these  are
viable)  tend  to  lower  long-run  productivity  potentials  and,  at  least  in  manufacturing,  their
burden appears  to be greater the further a given country  is from  best-practice  technology. That
is,  strict  regulation  hinders  the  adoption  of  existing  technologies,  possibly  by  reducing
competitive  pressures, technology  spillovers, or the entry of new high-tech  firms.  At the same
time,  by  enhancing  incentives  and  competitive  pressures,  both  privatisation  and  entry
liberalisation  are estimated to have a positive impact on productivity.
All in  all, these results  on regulatory  settings,  privatisation  and regulatory  reform may  shed
some light on the observed  differences  in productivity growth patterns across OECD countries
over the past two decades. The wide  differences  in the depth  and  scope of regulatory reforms
across the two sides of the ocean,  and even  within  Europe,  may explain  why some countries
have  been  able  to  rebound  from  the  long-run  productivity  slowdown,  while  in  others
productivity  performance  is  still  poor.  The  estimates  suggest  that  the  negative  effects
stemming  from  a  more timid  regulatory  reform  may  have  been  particularly  strong  in  those
industries where European  countries suffer from a significant technology  gap (e.g.  ICT-related
industries).
2  THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP  AND  COMPETITION IN GROWTH
Multifactor  productivity performance can  be improved  in three main ways: i) by eliminating
slack in the use of inputs; ii) by adopting  new technology; and iii) by innovative activity.  Can
product  market  regulation  and  public  ownership  curb  the  ability  of  firms  to  exploit
6successfully  these channels  cf productivity  improvement?  Recent  theoretical  and  empirical
research  suggests  that this  may well  be  the  case to  the  extent  that  these  policies  influence
(directly  and  indirectly)  entrepreneurial  incentives  and  competitive  pressures.  Therefore,
looking at what  is  known  about the  linkage  between  governance  arrangements,  competition
and  performance  provides  clues  on  the  ways  in  which  regulation  can  have  a bearing  for
productivity outcomes.
2.1  Ownership and  performance
Privatisation  policies  are based  on two main  assumptions:  i) private  ownership of business
enterprises  is  superior  from  the  point of view  of productive  efficiency;  and  ii)  the  risk of
regulatory  failure  in  network  industries  is reduced  when  direct  control  is  replaced  by arm's
length  regulation.  The  idea  that  ownership per se has  positive  implications  for  productive
efficiency and the effectiveness of regulation  has been fiercely debated in academic circles for
several decades.7 Recent economic  research  has focused  on three  implications of privatisation
that could justify the  conjectured  improvements  in efficiency  performance:  i) changes  in the
behaviour of stakeholders;  ii)  changes in agency relationships within the firm; and iii)  changes
in  the  insulating  potential  with  respect  to  influence-seeking  activities  of organised  pressure
groups.
The  behaviour of stakeholders  is  expected  to  change  because  the  reallocation  of property
rights implied  by privatisation  is  likely to affect both  the objectives  of owners and managers
and  the  incentives  for  the  former  to  monitor  the  latter.  Incentives  for  monitoring,  cost
efficiency  and innovation  are believed  to be stronger  in private firms  because the owners (or
managers acting on behalf of the owners) can fully appropriate the benefits of monitoring, cost
reductions  or  quality  improvements,  while  in  public  enterprises  these  benefits  ultimately
accrue  to  tax-payers  that  have  no  direct  control  over  the  firm's  choices.89 A  multitude  of
empirical  studies  have  tested  these  propositions  indirectly,  looking  at  the  implications  of
differences  (or  changes)  in  ownership  for  company  performance.  In  a  recent  paper  in  the
Journal of Economic Literature, Megginson  and  Netter  (2001)  summarise  the  empirical
evidence  reaching  the  twin  conclusions  that  "research now  supports the proposition that
privately owned firms are more  efficient and more profitable than otherwise-comparable
state-owned  firms"  and that  "privatisation 'works,  in the sense that divested  firms always
become more efficient". 10
The main  repercussion that privatisation  may have on agency  relationships  is that the costs
of aligning  the  objectives  of managers  and  shareholders  are  likely  to  be  reduced  (see,  e.g.
Schmidt, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny,  1997). This is because company objectives are re-focused
and  a  range  of  market  signals  and  mechanisms  becomes  available  for  monitoring  the
7As recently as the  mid-1980s no consensus  had been reached amongst  analysts, and  privatisation was termed "a policy in search  of a rationale"
(Kay and Thompson,  1986)  For a summary of the theoretical debate around the ownership issue, see Laffont and Tirole (1993)
' The property  nghts  approach  is summarised  by Schleifer  (1998)  Shleifer  and  Vishny (1997)  charactense  state  ownership  as "an  example  of
concentrated control with no  cash flow nghts and harmful social objectives".
9Both the agency costs  and property nghts approachies  focus  on the influence of ownership on the behaviour of  managers  However, ovnership can
also  have  an  impact  on  the  effort  of workers.  Haskel  and  Sanchis  (1995)  show  that  if the  public  owner  maximises  a social  welfare  function
(compnsing  the  welfare of workers)  the  outcome of the  bargain between  v orkers and  managers  is a level of effort which  is lov er (i e  larger X-
inefficiency) in public enterpnses than in pnvate enterpnses,  where  managers maximise profits
5  In  addition,  a handful  of studies  has  directly  tested  the predictions  of the  property  rights  theory.  exploring  the  eIte,7punwits of changes  in
performance,  often  based  on  the  expenence  of transition  countries  (Claessens  el al,  1999,  Frydman  et al.  1999,  D'Souza el al,  2000)  Their
empincal  findings suggest that corporate objectives tend to be sharper,  and efficiency incentives are  stronger the more residual  nghts are allocated to
investors interested  in shareholders' value maximisation
7performance  of managers,  including  the  information  conveyed  by stock  prices, the  threat  of
takeovers  or bankruptcies  and  the  existence  of a  managerial  labour  market."  For example,
Cragg  and  Dyck  (1999)  relate  the  increased  frequency  of management  turnover  in  British
privatised  firms  to  an  increased  sensitivity  of owners  to  the  failure  by  managers  to  reach
established  objectives.  Related evidence  is provided  by D'Souza et al. (2000) and  Eckel et al.
(1997)  who  find  that  enterprise  restructuring  (including  changes  in  management  and  in
monitoring devices)  is an important determinant of post-privatisation  efficiency gains.
Political  economy  studies  have  recently  strengthened  the  case  for privatisation,  suggesting
that  private  ownership  can  also  deal  more  efficiently  with  influence-seeking  activities.  For
instance,  when the ability of politicians  to subsidise  private  firms is restricted  (e.g.  due to the
negative  political  repercussions  resulting  from  the  financing  of  such  subsidies)  resource
allocation  is improved  by privatisation,  because  shareholders  of profitable  enterprises are  less
willing than public managers  to accept the inefficiencies  sought by interest groups.  Similarly,
privatisation  may  make  it politically  costlier  for ministers  in  charge  of industrial  policies  to
implement  exchanges with  special  interest  groups (such as excess  employment  against votes)
because  for the minister  it  is easier to  pay for the  implied productive  inefficiencies  using the
foregone  profits  of public  enterprises  rather  than  having  to  lobby  with  the  Treasury  (and
compete with other ministries) to obtain the subsidies that would be needed to induce a private
enterprise to hire excess  labour.'2
These  studies  suggest that,  at any given  level  of competition  in the market  supplied by the
privatised  firm,  the change  in  ownership  tends to  increase  the  incentives  to  monitor,  refine
monitoring devices  and increase the  insulation of management  from the influence  of pressure
groups.  Hence,  a  positive  impact  on  productive  efficiency  can  be  expected.  However,  in
network  industries,  privatisation  and  arms'  length  regulation  may  not be  able  to bring these
expected  benefits.  This  is  because  ownership  and  control  may  remain  distant  (due  to  the
frequent  incorporation  of privatised  utilities as public  companies),  new agency problems  may
arise (due to the multiple-principal  situation engendered  by the additional  control rights of the
regulator)  and  political  interference  may persist (due  to the  strategic  role played  by utilities
and the near coincidence  between their customers  and  the electorate).  In these  industries,  the
effects of privatisation  are closely  related to the  creation of sufficient  market  pressures in  the
potentially-competitive  segments  of the  industry  and  to the  regulation  of access  to the  non-
competitive  segments.  Lack of competition  in upstream or downstream  markets can thwart the
incentives  for productivity  improvements.'3 An  ill-designed  access  regulation  can distort  the
investment  incentives  of  the  company  running  the  network,  with  potentially  negative
consequences  on  productivity.  Therefore,  especially  in  industries  with  natural  monopoly
elements,  the  impact  of privatisation  on  efficiency  is  still  largely  an empirical  matter  to  be
verified  at the industry or firm level.
" However,  if the  managerial  market  is common  to  private  and  public  sectors.  public and  pn%ate  managers  may  be  subject  to  similar pressures
related to reputation (Estrin  and Perotin,  1991)  On the other  hand. objective-related compensation schemes (such  as performance  bonuses and stock
options), which  may help establish correct  sets of incentives for managers of private firms, are  usually unavailable to public managers
2 In other words. privatisation  forces the politicians to intemnalise the  cost of  the productive  inefficiencies, thereby changing their preferred  outcome
(Shleifer and Vishny.  1994, Boycko et al,  1996)
'Of course lack of competition also has negative implications for (illuceairte  efficiency, which however  is outside the scope of this study
82.2  Competition and performance
While  privatisation may  lead to an improvement  in the  level of productive  efficiency of the
firms  involved,  policies aimed  at enhancing market competition (e.g.  by removing  barriers to
entry  in  potentially  competitive  markets)  are expected  to  have  more  widespread  effects  on
both  static  and  dynamic  efficiency.  Static  gains  are  related  to  the  elimination  of
x-inefficiencies  as the  monopolists'  "quiet  life"  habits  are  stirred  by competitive  pressures.
Dynamic  gains are  also  likely  as  firms  continue to  improve  their performance  in  ways they
would  not  have  had  competitive  pressures  been  weak  (Winston,  1993;  Meyer  and  Vickers,
1997).  At  least  three different  channels  leading  to dynamic  efficiency  improvements  can  be
identified.  First, competition creates greater opportunities  for comparing performance,  making
it  easier  for  the  owners  or  the  market  to  monitor  managers.  Second,  cost-reducing
improvements  in  productivity could  generate  higher revenue  and profit  in a more  competitive
environment  where  the  price  elasticity  of demand  tends  to  be  higher.  Third,  since  more
competition  is likely to raise the risk of losing market shares  at any given level of managerial
effort, managers may work harder to avoid this outcome.'4
The  effects  of product market  competition  on dynamic  efficiency  may also  arise  indirectly
via  the  incentives  to  innovate,  but  this  channelt  is  not  straightforward.  The  basic
Schumpeterian  model  suggests  that  innovation  and  growth  are  declining  with  competition
because  the monopoly rents from innovation tend to be dissipated more quickly when there is
stronger  competition.  However,  extensions  of this  model  yield  a  more  complicated  picture
(Aghion  and  Howitt,  1998;  Boone,  2000a).  Intensified  competition  may  force  managers  to
speed  up  the  adoption  of new  technologies,  in  order  to avoid  loss of control  rights  due to
bankruptcy.  Even  when  firms  have  similar  cost  structures  (the  case  of "neck  and  neck"
competition)  and  technological  progress  is  more  gradual,  stronger  competition  may  induce
firms to increase R&D investment  in order to acquire a lead over their rivals.
The empirical  evidence supporting  these theoretical  considerations  is still fairly limited and
not  always  univocal.  A positive relationship  between  competition  and innovative activity (at
each  given  level  of protection  of intellectual  property  rights)  was found  by Nickell  (1996),
Blundell  et al. (1995,  1999)  and  Bassanini  and  Ernst  (2002),  though  Aghion  et al. (2001)
present  evidence  that  support  a  hump-shaped  relationship.'5 A  number  of  studies  report  a
positive  impact  of domestic  competition  on  firm-level  productivity  in  the  United  Kingdom
(Nickell,  1996;  Blanchflower  and  Machin,  1996;  Nickell  et al.,  1997;  Disney et at.,  2000).
Other  studies  find  a positive  link between  technical  efficiency  and competition  at the firm-
level  (Caves  and  Barton,  1990;  Caves  et al.  1992;  and  Green  and  Mayes  1991)  or at  the
industry-level  (e.g. Porter,  1990;  McKinsey  Global  Institute,  1997;  Baily and  Gerbach,  1995;
and  several  articles  in  OECD,  2001b).  Trade  liberalisation  is  also  found  to  have  positive
effects  on  both  the  level  and  growth  rates  of  productivity  (e.g.  MacDonald,  1994;  Van
Wijnbergen  and  Venables,  1993).  These  studies  tend  to  conclude  that  domestic  and
international  competition  (proxied  by  market  concentration,  size of rents,  import penetration
rates, etc.)  is key for productivity  improvements.'6
These channels are highlighted  by Lazear and Rosen  (1981).  Nalebuffand  Stiglitz(1983) and Aghion and Howitt (1998)
The  interplay between  innovation  incenti,es and  competitive  pressures  may  indeed  result  in  a hump-shaped  relationship  (Aghlon el  ll. 2001)
Perfect competition  makes  firns  indifferent  r,,i.--is  the choice  whether  to  innovate  or not,  but  the possibility  to  appropnate  rents  coupled  with
competitive struggle  makes innovation  desirable. When rent protection becomes strong enough, incentives to innovate fade out again.  Therefore,  if a
market  moves from monopoly to  perfect competition, innovative activity may first increase  and then decrease
6  Baily and  Gerbach  (1995)  also  point  to  the  importance  of 'global  competition'-that  is. exposure  to  the best  producers  wherever  they  are
located-for productivity  growth
9In  this  paper  we  adopt  a  different  strategy.  Instead  of using  proxies  for  product  market
competition,  such  as  concentration  indices,  mark-up  estimates  or  measures  of  trade
openness,  we look at some  of the potential  determinants  of competition.  Looking at  policies
that  affect  competition  rather  than  attempting  to  measure  directly  market  pressures  has
conceptual  and empirical  advantages.  First, direct measures of competition,  such  as indices of
concentration  or mark-ups, are  plagued with problems of interpretation  and accuracy. Notably,
such  pressures  should  be  measured  at  the  level  of relevant  markets,  which  are  difficult  to
circumscribe,  and standard  measures are  not always monotone  in the degree of competition."
Second,  direct measures  are often  endogenous  to outcomes.  For  instance,  usual  measures  of
MFP  are  directly  related  to  the  remuneration  of  factors  of production.'8 Finally,  direct
measures  are  not  interpretable  in terms  of policies:  for  instance,  finding  an  effect  of market
power on MFP does not provide indications on which  policies  should be followed to improve
outcomes.  Regulations  are  less  affected  by  these  shorthcomings:  they  generally  have  a
univocal  and  across-the-board  impact  on  competition  and  they  bear a  direct  link  to  policy.
Moreover,  over reasonable  lapses of time, they can be assumed to be exogenous,  especially to
MFP outcomes that  are usually reported  with lags and often  bear  little relationship with  more
timely measures of productivity (see above).'9
3  PRODUCT  MARKET  REGULATION,  GOVERNANCE  AND COMPETITION  IN
OECD  COUNTRIES
Emphasis  on privatisation  and domestic and  international  competition  has been the leitmotiv
of structural  reform over the last quarter of century.  Summary measures of the evolution  of the
business  environment  in  OECD  product  markets  indeed  point  to  an  increasing  pro-market
orientation  in  most  countries.  For  instance,  the  index  provided  by  the  Fraser  Foundation
(Economic Freedom of the  World),  which  is  partly  survey-based,  moved  towards  a  more
competitive  environment  in  all the  major  OECD  regions  since  1975.20  A  number of studies
have  documented  the  generalised  effort  of regulatory  reform  as  well  as  reforms  in  specific
industries.2'
How  did differences  in  the pace and the scope of reform  affect the  international  and  inter-
industry patterns  of regulation?  Here we  provide a  tentative answer to this question  focusing
on  a  new  set of indicators  constructed  at  the  OECD  that  covers  both  economy-wide  and
industry-specific  regulations.22 It  is  important  to  note  at  the  outset  that  the  primary  aim  of
these  indicators  was  to  report  restrictions  to  competition  and  private  governance.  Thus,  the
'7 For example. Boone  (2000b)  suggests that there may  be a hump-shaped  relationship between  the degree of product market competition and mark-
ups
IS Amongst the  very few cross-country studies that explore the role of  competition on productivity. Cheung and Garcia Pascual  (2001)  use mark-ups
and concentration  indexes  At the  finn-level, Nickell  (1996). Nickell  ei al  (1997) and  Disney  el a/  (2000)  use  market  share  indicators  to capture
competitive  pressures  However, the  potential  problem of endogeneity  is even  more serious with finm-level  data,  insofar  as high-productivity  firms
may gain market  shares  and enjoy innovation rents
' Several  recent  studies show that  regulatory decisions  can be  influenced by  perfonmance outcomes  The  latter, however, are  usually timely and
straightforward  indicators  such  as  prices  or  labour  productivity  See,  for  instance,  Steiner  (2001)  concerming  refonms  in  the  electncity  supply
industry. and Duso and Roller (2001)  concenming refonms in the telecommunications  industry
2" The  Economic  Freedom  of the  World  index, which  measures  the  market  friendliness of policies  on a 0-10  scale (from  least  to  most  market
friendly),  increased by 12  per cent in North Amenca.  30 per cent  in Europe.  14 per  cent  in Japan  and 44  per cent  in Australia-New Zealand  since
1975  The index has a broad  and eclectic coverage. going  from the size of government to the  rule of law  It includes mnformation  on policies, market
outcomes and business sentiment  For details, see Gwartney  and Lawson (2001)
21 See,  for  instance,  the papers  in Oxford  Review of Economic  Policy (2001).  OECD (2001b)  and the  references  therein,  as well  as the  country
experiences reported in the 01(.('l  Revie%s ofRegulatory Refinim
22 Some of the basic  data  used to construct  these indicators are  available on the  OECD  website. Other data  can be found in  Nicoletti et a/  (1999),
Gonenq ceal  (2001)  and  Nicolcttie al  (2001)
10weights given  to the various regulatory  provisions they cover reflect the potential  importance
of regulations  for these outcomes.  The  indicators  were  not constructed  expressly to  measure
the effects of such restrictions on MFP or other specific economic variables. 23
Assessing  and  comparing  across  countries  the  friendliness  of  regulatory  policies  to
competition  involves  conceptual  and  interpretative  issues. While  it  is relatively  easy to point
out  broad  policy  measures  aimed  at  increasing  market  openness  and  competitive  pressures
(e.g.  trade  liberalisation,  administrative  simplification),  the  impact  on  incentives  and
competition  of some  aspects  of regulatory  reform  is  less  easy  to  assess.  For  instance,  the
extent  to  which  privatisation  increases  market  pressures  on  the  management  of privatised
firms  is somewhat  controversial.  Similarly,  the jury is  still out on  precisely which  regulatory
policies  are  conducive  to  stronger  competition  in  industries  where  potentially-competitive
markets  coexist  with  elements  of  natural  monopoly.24 Moreover,  turning  qualitative
information  concerning  regulations  into  quantitative  data  necessary  involves  assumptions,
simplifications  and  subjective  choices.  This  section  addresses  these  issues  by  summarizing
how the indicators were constructed, checking  their robustness to changes  in assumptions  and
methods  and, especially, highlighting the emerging  patterns of regulatory reform.  A complete
taxonomy of the indicators and further details about methodology  and sensitivity  can be found
in the appendix.
3.1  Summarizing  the regulatory environment
There  are  two main  areas  of regulation  that are  likely  to  have  an  impact on  governance
and/or product market competition:
*  Provisions  that  aim  at  establishing  partial  or  full  state control over  resources  or
economic activities  that could, in principle,  be managed  by private agents (e.g. public
ownership and/or control, restrictions on price setting and/or other firm's choices).
*  Provisions  that  create barriers  to entrepreneurship  in domestic  markets,  where  fixed
costs,  technology  and  demand  conditions  make  competition  viable.  These  barriers
may originate  either  from  explicit attempts to carve  the structure  of markets  or from
provisions that have (intentional  or unintentional)  effects on entry. They include laws
or regulations  limiting the number of competitors  or providing  an unfair  advantage  to
some  of them  (such  as  antitrust  exemptions);  structural  arrangements  that  make  it
difficult for competitors to access fixed networks (e.g. vertical  integration);  regulatory
and  administrative  burdens that  impose  fixed  costs  on  businesses;  and policies  that
create  impediments  to international  trade  and investment  (such  as foreign  investment
restrictions and tariff and non-tariff barriers).
Focusing on these two broad areas, we aim at highlighting three main types of cross-country
patterns  of  regulation  potentially  relevant  for  explaining  differences  in  productivity
performance.  First,  specific  regulatory  interventions  may exist  in some  countries,  but  not in
others  (e.g.  public  enterprises,  restrictions  to  entry  or  price  controls  in  certain  potentially
competitive  markets).  Second,  regulatory  provisions  to  overcome  market  failures  may  exist
everywhere  (e.g. barriers  to entry in natural  monopoly  industries or screening  procedures  for
"  The indicators are  "multipurpose" and have been used to investigate vanous channels through which regulation may affect  economic outcomes.
ranging  from R&D (Bassanini  and Emnst,  2002)  to wage  premia (Jean and Nicoletti. 2002)  and employment  (Nicoletti and Scarpetta.  2001)
2  Open  issues include  which access  provisions to  nctworks maximise  the  benefits of competition in  the provision of downstream  services. what
degree  of vertical  separation  of utilities  mtnimises  the  incentives for  anticompetitive  behaviour  by  incumbents,  and  what  kind of retail  price
regulation (if any) maximises the passthrough of  eficiency gains from  upstream competitors to final consumers
IIstartups),  but  their  stringency  may  differ  across  countries.  Third,  the  scope  of regulations
designed  to  promote  competition  in  network  industries  (e.g.  vertical  separation  or  access
pricing)  can  also  differ  across countries.  It  is  important  to  note that the construction  of our
indicators  is  based  on  the  hypothesis  that  regulatory  patterns  do  not  reflect  cross-country
differences  in the  level of public concern for the market failures  that motivate regulations,  but
rather  reflect regulatory  failure or policies  adverse  to competition.  Concretely,  for example,
heavier  administrative  burdens  for startups  in one  country  are  assumed  to reflect  regulatory
inefficiency  rather than  higher quality screening of firms. This seems a reasonable  assumption
since the focus is on differences  in regulation  across a set of relatively homogeneous  countries
in terms of economic,  political and social characteristics.
To  highlight  these  patterns,  we  look  at  both  general-purpose  and  industry-specific
regulations  (Table  3).  The  former  tend  to  affect  all  industries  alike, such  as  administrative
burdens  or  antitrust  exemptions  for  public  enterprises.  The  latter  are  tailored  to  specific
industries  (or  sets of industries).  Indeed,  many  regulations  are  industry-specific  and may  be
expected to have different effects on governance and competition across industries.  Therefore,
to  analyse  the  effects  of regulation  on  productivity,  it  is  crucial  to  look  at  both  these
dimensions of regulation.
[Table 3. Overview of regulatory indicators]
A  further  distinction  must  be  made  between  economy-wide  and  industry-level  regulatory
indicators.  The  former  summarize  information  on  both  general-purpose  and  (possibly)
industry-specific  regulations  into  a  single  indicator  for  each  country,  the  latter  summarize
information  concerning  specific  regulatory  provisions  that  affect  a  single  industry.  The
economy-wide  indicators  have  a  wider  coverage  of regulatory  areas  than  the  industry-level
indicators,  because  they  do  not  cover  necessarily  regulatory  details  in  all  individual
industries.25 For  instance,  they  take  an  extensive  view  of  state  control  and  barriers  to
entrepreneurship,  including  indirect  forms  of control  (such  as  the  use  of golden  shares  in
privatised  enterprises)  and  indirect  entry  barriers  (such  as  antitrust  exemptions  and
discriminatory  licensing procedures).
The  areas  and  dimensions  of  regulation  accounted  for  by  the  industry-level  indicators
depend  on  both  industry  characteristics  and  data  availability  (details  are  provided  in  the
appendix).  They generally  cover public ownership-narrowly  defined as majority control over
business  enterprises-and  barriers  to  entry-including  legal  and  structural  barriers,
administrative burdens and trade impediments, with a different weight given to these factors  in
manufacturing  and  non-manufacturing  industries  (see  Box  2).  However,  in  several  non-
manufacturing industries (e.g. retail trade, road  freight, railways, energy, communications)  we
also include other provisions,  such as price regulation and/or constraints  on business operation
(e.g. shop  opening  hours,  cabotage,  etc.)  and  we  ignore public  ownership  where  it  is either
irrelevant (e.g.  in retail trade) or difficult to assess (e.g. in financial  intermediation)  in virtually
all OECD countries.
Box 2. Differentiating  anticompetitive  regulations across  industries
We treated  barriers to entry  in  manufacturing  and non-manufacturing  industries differently,
reflecting  structural  differences  between  the  two  sectors.  In  non-manufacturing,  we  cover
mainly  legal  and  structural  barriers-such  as  restrictive  l.censing,  restrictions  on  the
"See  the appendix for a complete taxonomy of the  economy-wide and  industry-level indicators
12establishment  of foreign  companies,  legal  monopoly (or  duopoly), and vertical  integration  or
lack of third-party  access  in network  industries.  In manufacturing  industries we assumed that
relevant  barriers  included  only  administrative  burdens  and  tariff and  non-tariff  barriers  to
trade.  Clearly,  the  range  of  industry-specific  regulations  that  may  affect  product  market
competition  in manufacturing  industries  is wider (including,  for instance,  technical  or quality
standards,  intellectual  property  rights  and  antitrust  exemptions).  However,  cross-country
information  on  these  regulations  is  hard  to  find,  and  their  impact  on  competition  is often
difficult to assess.
As  regards  price  controls,  we distinguished  between  competitive  industries  and  industries
where  market power  is widespread  (e.g. due to technology):  while  we regard  controls  in the
former  as  anti-competitive  (especially  when  enforced  by  incumbents),  we  view  controls  in
industries  with  market  power  as  anticompetitive  when  they  fail  to discipline  rents,  lead  to
distortions (e.g. the so-called Averch-Johnson  effects) or encourage anticompetitive  behaviour
(e.g. opportunities  for cross-subsidisation  and predation).  A distinction along the same lines is
made  for other constraints  on  business  operation.  In competitive  industries,  such  constraints
are  deemed to restrict market  mechanisms,  but universal  service  obligations  are not included
among anti-competitive  regulations  in network  industries. This is because,  in general,  it is  not
the obligation  per se  but the way  in which  it  is implermented  that  may hinder competition  in
certain  network  industries  (see,  for  instance,  Gonenc  et al., 2001)  and,  unfortunately,  cross-
country data on the implementation  of universal service obligations are not widely available.26
One  outstanding  problem  with  measuring  the  anti-competitive  impact  of regulations  is  the
potential hiatus between  legal provisions  and enforcement.  Stringent  regulations  may not bite
on competition if they are not enforced and, conversely,  even the most liberal regulations  may
not  promote  competition  if  their  provisions  (e.g.  concerning  access  to  networks  or
administrative procedures) are not concretely  implemented.  Relatedly,  national laws may have
little  bearing  for markets  when  their  application  depends  on local  authorities,  or  when  local
legislations  can be  opposite in  spirit.  In our work,  we try to account  for the impact of formal
regulatory frameworks  on  market mechanisms  at the industry  level by including  measures of
actual market  and industry structure in the summary  indicators (when the data are available).27
The  measures  used  include  the  market  shares  of  new  entrants,  the  extent  of  industry
unbundling and the share of equity owned by the  government.  This, of course,  does  not take
care of the potential conflict between national and local  levels of government.28
The construction  of economy-wide  and industry-level  indicators  involved turning sparse and
mostly qualitative  information  into  cardinal  values  that allow  ranking  countries'  regulations
according  to  their  potential  impact  on  governance  and  competition.  We  did  so  following  a
multi-step,  bottom-up  approach (see the appendix  for details):
*  We  first  constructed  indicators  for  each  of the  regulations  covered  by  our  data,
ranking  countries  on a  common  (0-6)  scale  from  least to  most  restrictive.  Thus,  all
2"  A typical example  is the obligation for an incumbent to provide service to some customers at pnces below cost while funding the  losses with  rents
earned  from the sale of  other  services
2  However, market structure information  is omitted from the indicators used  in the  productivity regressions to avoid endogeneity problems
'8  An  alternative  approach would  have  been  to  forego  the  "objective"  measurement  of regulation  in favour of "subjective"  measures  based  on
business or consumer surveys. We view the subjective approach  as unpromising for  many reasons  First, it cannot reach the same  level of detail as
the  objective  measures  Second,  survey  results  suffer  from  vanous  sources  of bias,  notably  they  are influenced  by cultural  and  socto-political
environment,  cyclical  swings  and other  factors dilffilt to  control  for  Third.  because  of this,  the  cross-country  comparability  of the  results  is
questionable  Fourth,  while objective  measures can be  deemed to be "exact-  (apart  from, hopefully small, measurement  error), subjecti'.e measures
are  subject  to  sampling  error.  A  fuller discussion of the relative  ments of "objective"  and '"subjective" measures  of regulation can  be found  in
Nicoletti and Pryor (200 1)
13indicators have a  consistent ordinal  meaning,  i.e.  they are  all increasing  in the degree
of restrictions  imposed by regulation on competition or private governance.29
*  We  also  identified  coherent  sets  of  regulations  in  an  area  (e.g.  state  control  or
administrative  regulation)  or  industry.  This  was  necessary  because  comparing
individual  regulatory  provisions  across countries  is  possible,  but  it  is of little  use  in
empirical  analyses.  Moreover,  individual  provisions  in  an  area  (e.g.  administrative
procedures  needed  for  a  startup)  or  industry  (e.g.  the  regulation  of access  pricing)
cannot be assessed  in isolation from other regulations  affecting the same area (e.g. the
existence  of one-stop  shops)  or  industry  (e.g. the  degree  of vertical  separation  of
natural monopoly  and competitive segments).
*  We then aggregated  the resulting indicators  into area-wide  or industry-wide  indicators
using simple or weighted  averages, adapting  the  aggregation  methods to the  question
asked  and the  availability  of data.  In  particular,  whenever  possible,  we  used  factor
analysis to determine the weight structure (see appendix for details).30
*  Finally, we repeated  aggregation  for  progressively  larger areas or industry groupings
to obtain the summary indicators used in the empirical analysis.
This  approach  implies  that  the  summary  indicators  of  regulation  are  based  on  detailed
qualitative  information  concerning  individual  regulatory  provisions.3'  The  advantage  is  that
the relative  position of a country  along an area-wide  or industry-wide  indicator can be traced
to  the  country's  relative  positions  in  each  of  the  underlying  regulations  covered  by  the
summary indicator.  Another advantage  is that indicators  can be aggregated  (or disaggregated)
differently  to suit the particular  purpose  of the empirical  analysis.  For example,  while in  this
section  we use  all regulatory dimensions to describe  the cross-country  patterns of regulation,
in the econometric  analysis  we focus  only on  the effects of public ownership  and  barriers  to
entry on MFP.
An important element of our analysis  is the time  pattern  of public ownership  and regulatory
reform.  To  account  for  differences  in  both  the  initial  levels  of  public  ownership  and  its
evolution over time, we used information  on the shares of public enterprises  in business sector
activity  and  aggregate  privatisation  proceeds  over  the  past  two  decades.32 The  resulting
dynamics  of public  ownership  proxies  for  general  trends  in  state  retrenchment.  Regulatory
reform  has  concerned  both  international  trade  in  manufactured  goods  and  domestic  non-
manufacturing  markets.  On  the  trade  side,  we  constructed  series  for  tariff  and  non-tariff
barriers  at the 2-digit  and aggregate  manufacturing  levels since  the second-half of the  1980s.
Cross-country  historical  information  on  domestic  regulations  in  non-manufacturing  is  scarce,
but we were  able to collect such data for seven  industries,  covering the energy,  transport  and
communications  sectors,  which  account  for  a  significant  share  of non-manufacturing  and
19 For instance,  industry-specific indicators of price regulation in network industries assign a low ranking to countries  that  have adopted  a price cap
mechanism  in non-competitiNe  markets  (because  such a mechanism  tends  to  discipline rents)  and a high  ranking  to countries  that have no  pnce
regulation  (or discretionary  price  regulation)  in  such markets  Conversely,  industry-specific indicators  of pnce regulation  in  competitive industnes
(e g  road freight) assign a  low ranking to countries that  have no pnce regulation and a  high ranking to countnes where administrative controls exist
'° Factor analysis was  used as a descriptive device to  identify clusters of regulatory provisions belonging  to the  same  (unobserved)  regulatory  sub-
areas and determine the weights of individual regulations  for economy-wide  indicators and  certain industry-level indicators for which a large amount
of  data concering different  areas of  regulation were available
'1 The basic  information  can. therefore,  be  recovered  easily for the  purpose of cross-country  compansons or empincal estimation  (for  instance  to
create dummies  that isolate cross-country  differences in basic regulatory provisions).
'I  Initial shares of public enterpnses were dra%sn  from  several  sources (OFCI) Econ,omic Stine,ys, FRI> A4nnital Reports, the  tn-annual reports  of
the c  entre kiuropiemi  des Dnirepnses  a P  unrcrpauto,i  Pubh,a te CEEP,  the annual  reports of  comwnic  FIreeveont of tde  WVornl.  data on privatisation
proceeds  comes  from  the O(I'D  Priralt,savwoa  Daluhase  We  make  assumptions  to  convert yearly  pnvatisation proceeds  into  foregone shares  of
public enterpnses in GDP.
14constitute  an  important  input  into  manufacturing  activities.  Though  the  regulatory  areas
covered  by  these data  change  across  industries,  they  include  in  all  cases  barriers  to  entry.33
The  industry-specific  information  about  the  dynamics  of regulatory  reform  was  used  to
differentiate  developments  in  manufacturing  and  services  (pooling together  developments  in
several  sub-sectors).  The  data  appendix  provides  more details  about the  construction  of the
time-series  indicators.
3.2  What are the emerging  regulatory patterns?
The  three  panels  in  Figure  3  describe  overall  public  ownership  and  privatisation,
liberalisation  of trade  in  manufactured  goods  and  regulatory  reform  in  non-manufacturing
industries  by means of the economy-wide  and industry-level  indicators of regulation,  focusing
on the sample of core OECD countries analysed  in this paper.
[Figure 3. Privatisation and regulatory  reform in OECD countries]
Public ownership  (measured  on a 0-6  scale,  from the  lowest to the  highest  share of GDP)
varied  widely  at  the  beginning  of the  period,  with  most  continental  European  countries,
Ireland  and  New  Zealand  having  between  20  and  30  per  cent  of  non-agricultural  business
sector  GDP  produced  by public  enterprises  against  a  mere  I  to  10  per  cent  in  the United
States, Japan and Switzerland (Figure  3, Panel  A). Privatisation  affected virtually  all countries
but to very different degrees:  the most spectacular  reductions  in public ownership  occurred in
Portugal,  New Zealand,  Australia  and the United  Kingdom.  These  aggregate  data  mask wide
differences  in  both  the sectoral  presence  of public  enterprises  and cross-sectoral  patterns of
privatisation.  While public enterprises  initially played  an important role in non-manufacturing
natural  monopoly  industries  of most  OECD  countries,  in  only  a few  (including  some  large
European  countries)  their  presence  was  also  significant  in  the  manufacturing  sector.34
Moreover,  a closer  look at the evolution  of OECD privatisation  proceeds  by sector suggests a
pattern  in which a first wave of sell-offs of manufacturing  firms  was followed  by widespread
divestitures  in non-manufacturing  (and natural  monopoly) industries (OECD, 200  1c).
In  manufacturing,  regulatory  reform  concerned  mostly  administrative  simplification  and
trade  liberalisation.  According  to  a  recent  survey,  a  majority  of  OECD  countries  had
programmes aimed  at easing administrative  burdens on firms  already underway  at the  end of
the  1990s.35 Trade  liberalisation  involved both  a reduction  in tariffs and an alleviation of non-
tariff barriers  (such  as  voluntary  price or export  restraints,  restrictive  licensing  and quotas).
We  concentrate  on  the  latter  because,  as  a  result  of trade  negotiations  mainly  concerning
tariffs,  non-tariff  barriers  have  acquired  greater  importance  and  often  constitute  genuine
barfiers  to  entry  in  domestic  markets.  Figure  3 (Panel  B)  shows that  the  share  of imports
affected by non-tariff barriers has declined in almost all countries,  particularly  in Australia and
New Zealand  (from already  low levels  in  the late  1980s),  and  in the  United  States  and some
" UNCTAD  reports  data  on tanff and  non-tariff barriers at  the  6-digit level  for  1988.  1993  and  1996  Aggregates  for  2-digit  industnes  were
computed  using  import weights, the  manufacturing  aggregate was obtained  using sectoral  value-added weights  Seseral published  and  unpublished
sources  were used to complete and cross-check  the available  information on domestic  non-manufacturing  regulations  These  included publications
of  the  OECD,  the  European  Conference  of  Ministers  of  Transport,  the  EC.  the  World  Bank.  the  Center  for  the  Study  of  Regulated
Industries(Privatisation International.  See the appendix for details on methods  and sources
'  In  1998.  between 80 and  90 per cent of OECD countries (depending  on the industry) still  had public enterprises  in natural monopoly  industries,
while  only  half of them  had  public enterprises  in  manufacturing  (Gonenc et a/,  2001).  Within the  EU. only Sweden.  Finland and  France  were
estimated to have more  than 2 per cent of manufacturing GDP produced  by public enterpnses  (authors'  estimates based on data by CEEP.  2000)
'4  Data  from  the  (2k()  fl:enait,o,ial  Regulation  D)atahese  suggests  that  over  90  per cent  of countries  had  explicit  programmes  to  reduce
administrative  burdens and over 60 per cent  had programmes  underway to reduce the  number of licenses and permits  required to  start and operate a
business.
15European  countries  (from high  levels). Nonetheless,  in  1996  barriers  remained  significant  in
many OECD countries.
Regulatory  reform  has  been  deepest  in  non-manufacturing  where,  partly  due  to  strong
economies of scale and pervasive market  failures, markets  were  most restricted by regulations
concerning  entry,  prices  and  supply.  Due  to the  scarce  exposure  to  trade  of these  markets,
domestic  regulatory  reform  was  the  main  policy  tool  for stepping  up competitive  pressures
where competition  was  deemed  viable.  At the same time,  the significant  role played  by non-
manufacturing  public  enterprises  in  most  countries  highlighted  governance  problems  and
regulatory  failures associated  with public control and led to widespread privatisation.  Figure  3
(Panel  C) reports  the evolution  of the summary  indicator of regulatory reform  (ranging from 0
to  6  from  most  to  least  competitive)  computed  as  the  simple  average  of  industry-level
regulatory  indicators  for  utilities,  telecommunications  and  transportation  industries.36 The
indicator suggests  that  regulation  in  these  industries  was tight in  all OECD  countries  in  the
1970s,  though  more  so  in  Europe  and  Japan.  It  is also  apparent that  the  United  States,  the
United Kingdom  and Japan took the  lead  in regulatory  reform  during the  1980s, followed  by
Australia/New  Zealand  and, to a  lesser extent, Europe  in the following  decade.  By the end of
the  1990s, common-law  countries  were clearly ahead  of Europe and Japan  in removing  legal
and structural barriers to entry and making market structIure  more competitive.
As a result of differences  in initial conditions  and the extent of regulatory reforms, the policy
environment of OECD  countries  still  differed  a  lot at the end  of the  1990s  both  in  specific
non-manufacturing  industries  and economy-wide.  The two  panels  in  Figure  4  capture  these
differences  by means of our economy-wide  and industry-level  indicators  of regulation  (both
increasing  in  the  level  of  public  ownership  and  restrictions  to  market  mechanisms).  As
illustrated  in  Panel  A,  the  industry-level  environment  was  widely variable  both  within  and
across  countries.37 Even  in  the  "liberal"  group,  including  most  common-law  and  Nordic
countries,  a  relatively  restrictive  environment  could  be  found  in  some  industries  (e.g. retail
distribution  in the United Kingdom  and Finland)  and, conversely,  countries  in the "regulated"
group,  including some central  and Southern-European  countries,  had  a liberal  environment  in
some  industries  (e.g.  retail  distribution  in  Switzerland  and  business  activities  in  Greece).
Indicators  for  non-manufacturing  industries  often  omit  barriers  to trade  and administrative
regulations.  Once  these,  as  well  as  other  economy-wide  regulatory  areas  (e.g.  antitrust
exemptions for public enterprises),  are considered  (Panel  B), common-law  countries  continue
to  stand  out  for  their  liberal  environment,  now  including  Ireland,  which  benefits  from
relatively  light barriers  to trade  and economy-wide  regulations  (e.g. administrative  burdens),
while  at the  other  end  the most  regulated countries  appear to be  Italy,  Greece,  Norway  and
France.38 Since, with  few exceptions (Norway  and Canada)  barriers  to international  trade  and
investment  are  very  homogeneous  across  countries,  most  of  the  cross-country  variance
originates  from differences  in  administrative  and economic  regulations  (where  the  latter are
defined to include both state control and barriers to entrepreneurship).
[Figure 4. Regulatory environment in  1998]
"' It should be  stressed that important  domestic  reforms were  also made  in competitive  industries such  as retail  disinbution and financial  services,
but historical data are lacking for most OECD  countries
"  For illustrative  purposes, countries are  ranked according to the deviation of the average  indicator across industries from the corresponding OECD
average
'  Some of these countries have implemented  further  privatisation  and regulatory reforms since  1998  For  instance. for Greece  see OECD  (2001d).
and,  for Italy, see OECD (2001c)  and Nicoletti (2002).
163.3  Robustness of the findings
To  what extent  do the  patterns  highlighted  in  Figures  3-4  reflect actual  developments  and
differences  among OECD  countries?  One way  to check  the  robustness  of our  findings  is to
compare  them  with  alternative  indicators  that  broadly  address  the  same  phenomena  using
different  approaches.  This  comparison  can  be  done  for  the  economy-wide  regulatory
environment,  for  which  two  alternative  indicators  have  been  recently  proposed  by  Pryor
(2002)  and Kaufman  et al. (1999).39  These  indicators  refer to the  same  period  (1997/98)  and
cover  roughly  the  same  ground  (state  control  and  competitive  pressures).  Comparing  the
country rankings for our indicator with those  implied by the two other indicators,  the bivariate
correlations  range  from  55  to  67  per  cent  and  are  significant  at  conventional  levels  (see
appendix for details). These correlations  are all the more reassuring  in view of the "subjective"
nature  of the alternative  indicators,  which  are mostly based  on data originating  from business
surveys.  The indicators are  likely, therefore,  to give actual enforcement  a  heavier weight than
the formal framework.  This may explain differences  in the assessment of individual  countries,
such  as  the  United  States  (which  suffers  from  so-called  "adversarial  legalism"  in  Pryor's
ranking)  or Switzerland  (which  is  difficult to  classify  due  to  its  peculiar  federal  structure).
Despite these  idiosyncrasies,  the three indicators seem to point broadly to the same economic
realities.
Another  way to assess the robustness  of our results  is to  check to what extent the patterns
highlighted by our indicator are  sensitive to changes  in aggregation  methods.  To this end,  we
recomputed  the  economy-wide  indicator  as  a  simple  average  of its  17  basic  sub-indices,
instead of using our original  set of weights (see  above).  The ranking  of the countries remains
largely unchanged  and the correlation  between  the two overall  indicators (as well  as  between
the  indicators  for the main  regulatory areas)  is over  90 per  cent.  Finally,  it  should be  noted
that,  because  overall  indicators  result  from the  aggregation  of a  large number of regulatory
items, errors  in measuring  individual  items are  likely to have  little  impact on overall  country
rankings.
On  the  whole,  these  considerations  suggest  that  changes  in  coverage,  data  collection
methods and aggregation  techniques and (a reasonable amount of) measurement  errors are not
likely to  affect  significantly  the  regulatory  patterns  presented  in  this  paper.  Of course,  the
ultimate  check  for  the  economic  relevance  of the  patterns  highlighted  by  the  indicators  in
Figures 3-4 is their ability to contribute to explain the observed variation  in different economic
outcomes, including multifactor productivity developments  across countries. This  is a task that
will be taken up  in the next sections of  this paper.
4  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE
4.1  The  basic MFP model
Our empirical  analysis  is centred on a multifactor productivity equation  specified  in order to
account  for the  possible  role  of country  and  industry-specific  factors.  Denote  countries  by
i=l,.,N, and  industries  byj=l  ...... , J.  Value  added  in  each  industry  at time  t  is produced
nTo our knowledge. no alternative cross-country  indicators of regulation arc available  at the  industry level
17with  labour  (total  hours  worked,  H)  and  physical  capital  (K)  according  to  a  standard
neoclassical  production technology:
YY,=Aj,-Fj(H#,, Ky,)[I
where F.()  is assumed to be  homogeneous of degree one and  exhibits decreasing  returns to
the  accumulation of each factor of production;  and A,y,  is an index of technological  efficiency
or multifactor productivity (MFP).
We  extend  the  conventional  endogenous  growth  model-in  which  MFP  is  generally
expressed  as  a  function  of knowledge  and  a  residual  set  of influences  (Aghion  and  Howitt,
1998) -- by assuming that, within each industry,  the level of efficiency depends on country and
industry  characteristics  as  well  as  technological  and  organisational  transfer  from  the
technology-leader  country (i = L). This implies that MFP  growth  in the frontier country  leads
to  faster  MFP growth  in  follower  countries  by widening  the  production  possibility  set.  We
assume  that,  in each industry, a country's distance from the technological  leader measures  the
scope for technological transfer.  The leader country  is defined as the country with the highest
level of MFP. Hence, multi-factor  productivity  growth  for a given  industryj of country i can
be modelled as follows: 40
A In Ay,  =  A#,A  In ALJ,  - a,j  In  i/  _  )  +  ,C,  [2]
where  c5y,  captures  the instantaneous  effect  of changes  in  growth of the  leader country;  ay,
indicates the pace of technological transfer; In(A/A,J,,.,  is the technology  gap between  country
i and the  technology  leader  and  c,, includes  all  other  influences  on  MFP  growth,  including
those related to differences  in regulations  across countries and industries (see below).
From the discussion  in the previous sections,  we also assume that  certain regulations  in the
product market, by creating entry barriers  or hindering  competition  amongst incumbents,  may
reduce  opportunities  and  incentives  for  the  adoption  of the  leading  technologies.  A  linear
formulation  of the  link  between  regulation  (PMR)  and  the  rate  of technology  transfer  in
non-frontier countries can be as follows:
aJt= ax,t  +  O 2ytPMRVjjj  [3]
Substituting  [3] into [2]  generates the following  specification:
A1nAj,  ,Qiu,AlnAljl-colylin(/  ),  1-f2PMg8-j/ ln(,/)z  +6,  [4]
In  deriving  a  specification  of the  MFP  equation  that  can  be  estimated  empirically,  it  is
important to notice that equation [4] can be seen as an error correction  equation derived  from a
first-order  autoregressive  distributed-lag  specification  in  which  the  MFP  level  in  each
country/industry  is cointegrated  with that of the leader,  i.e.:
° See  Scarpetta  and  Tressel  (2002a)  for more  details  on this productivity model  as  well  as  Gnffith et  al  (2000)  and  de  la  Fuente  and  Domenech
(2001 )  for similar specifications.
18In MFP,j  =,  j In  MFPjj_l+ /32j In MFPLJ, + P 3 j In MFPJ,.. 1 +  ,[  ]
Under the assumption  of long-run  homogeneity  (I-,B1,=P2,+p 33j) and rearranging equation  [5]
yields:
A In MFP,j, = l 2J  AIn MFPL4, - (I  - _,  )RMFP,,,,  +  [6]
where:  RMFRj,-jIn(MFPj1-I/MFBTi-i)
Equation  [6]  is  equivalent  to equation  [4]  above,  where  the coefficient  on relative  MFP  is
allowed to be a function of regulations.  In addition,  we have  imposed  that  the coefficient  on
MFP  growth  in  the country  leader (Ol)  and that on the technology  transfer (I-fl,)  vary only
across  industries  (in  the  empirical  analysis  we  further  restrict  them  to  vary  only  between
manufacturing and services).
Moreover,  the  error  term  in  equations  [5]  and  [6]  can  be  decomposed  into  a  vector  of
covariates  (Vy,),  including  structural  features  (e.g.  human  capital)  and  regulatory  policies,
potentially  affecting  the  level  of  MFP;  unobserved  country  and  industry  effects  (f,  gj,
respectively);  world macroeconomic  shocks (d,) and a serially uncorrelated error term.  (?7,,):
ThJ=>ZkVky1-l +f+gj+di+pj  [7]
k
From equation  [6]  it is clear that the coefficient of the MFP gap term  measures the speed of
(conditional)  convergence  to  the  long-run  steady  state  level  of  MFP.  Moreover,  in  the
presence  of  technological  convergence,  the  technological  distance  between  each
country/industry  and the  leader converges  to a constant  value. This implies that the vector of
covariates as well  as the country  and  industry fixed  effects translate  only  into  differences  in
MFP levels, and not into permanent  differences in growth rates of MFP.
4.2  Data and empirical Implementation
We estimated the productivity model  [6]-[7]  by means of a fixed-effect  estimator including
country and industry effects  and time dummies. The basic productivity  regression  includes  as
explanatory  variables  MFP growth  in  the  leader  country,  the technology  gap variable  and  a
proxy  for  human  capital.  This  regression  is  progressively  extended  to  include  various
indicators of product market regulation  and privatisation.  In all regressions,  we tested whether
regulatory  policies had  an  impact  on  long-run  productivity  levels,  both  directly  and through
their  influence  on  the  rate  of  technological  catch  up.  We  also  consistently  tested  for
differences  in  the estimated  coefficients  between  manufacturing  and  service  industries.4'  To
interpret the results,  it  should  be  noted  that there  is  a  mismatch  between  the  quality  of our
productivity and regulation  data. The best productivity data are for manufacturing,  where MFP
estimates  suffer  less  from  mis-measurement  problems,  while  the  most  complete  regulatory
"'  The  speed  of technological  catch-up  may  differ between  manufactunng  and services  due  to.  i)  the  different technologtcal  level  in  the  two
broadly-defined sectors, and  the  role played  by innovation and  adoption of new  technologies,  it) differences in  manufacturing  and  service s%orkers'
skills (a  complementary  input to new  technologies),  and tit) a different exposure to trade.
19data  are  for  the  service  sector.  The  empirical  analysis  covers  23  two-digit  industries  in
manufacturing  and business services  in  18 OECD countries over the period  1984-1998.42
4.2.1  Multifactor productivity data
The  main  source  of the  industry-level  productivity  data  is  the  OECD  STAN  database
(edition 2001) that contains internationally  comparable data on value added,  employment and
capital stocks. The labour input variable  is based on industry-level  data on employment and on
average  hours  worked,  the  latter  obtained  from  both  OECD  and  non-OECD  sources.  To
capture  the  influence  on  MFP  of differences  in  the  quality  of the  labour  input,  we  also
considered  different  levels  of  human  capital  across  countries,  industries, and  time.  The
appendix provides further details on these calculations.
The measure of MFP growth was computed  as follows (see also Box  1):
AMFP,t,  = Ayi,  - ay, *  Alt, - (I  - a.  ,  Ak,,  [8]
where y, I and k are respectively  the  logarithms of real value-added,  total hours worked  and
real capital stock.  Under perfect competition,  a  in equation  [8] can be proxied by the share of
labour compensation  in total costs.43 1
Following  Caves  et al. (1982)  we  used the following  (multilateral  productivity)  index as a
measure of the MFP level:
-L  'a  ''  KI-Gift
y  L,,  ,  L-yt
where a bar denotes a geometric average over all the countries for a given industryj and year
t. The  technological  frontier  is  defined  as the  highest  value  of MFP  level  relative  to  the
geometric  average  in each industryj  in the year t, and the technological  gap  is the difference
between the  level of MFP and the frontier level in each industry and year.
The calculations of MFP levels  required  the use of comparative  product price  levels across
countries  in  order  to  convert  the  value  of production  to  common  units,  while  taking  into
account differences  in the purchasing  power of each country's currency.  Ideally, comparative
product prices should be  measured at the producer  level, but survey data on production  prices
are  usually  available  only for  a  few countries  and  for  even  fewer  products.  Thus,  we used
estimates  of  industry-specific  expenditure  PPPs.  They  offer  a  better  basis  for  comparing
productivity  levels than standard aggregate GDP PPPs (as  in Bernard and Jones,  1996a,b).4
42 The countries  are  Australia, Austria.  Belgium, Canada,  Denmark.  Spain, Finland.  France,  (western)  Germany, Greece,  Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway,  Portugal,  Sweden,  United Kingdom  and United States  The  industry breakdov n is as follows'  17 manufacturing  industnes and 6 business
services industries  Agrculintre,  n;ing mu/an  qwjarorng. consIsrut inv,  elec,ncaY gaI lnid uxuter  as  well as comnswwiv anddpersonal senrices  have been
excluded from the analysis either because of particularly poor quality of the MFP data or because data on regulations were  lacking
41  In  a related  paper Scarpetta and Tressel  (2002a)  show that correcting the  labour share,  and thus the estimated  MFP  growth rate, for the presence of
mark-ups of  pnces over marginal  costs has little repercussion on the  baseline estimates  of the MFP equation  The labour  share, however, is volatile,
reflecting short-run  fluctuations  in demand  conditions and possibly the fact that  wages are not negotiated  on an  annual  basis  In order to  minimise
these short-run  fluctuations, we  used a measure of the labour share from Scarpetta and Tressel (2002a).  They regressed the labour share on country-
industry specific  fixed effects and on the logarithm of capital-labour ratio  Fixed  effects account for  unobserved factors influencing  the  technology
used (such  as endowments,  available technologies. institutional  factors)  Next, they used as a country/sector-specific  measure of  the labour share the
fined  value from this equation, which accounts for country-industry fixed components  plus variations due to changes in the capital intensity
4 The  potential  problems ansing from  using aggregate  PPPs are discussed  in Harngan  (1999)  and Sorensen  (2001)  In a sensitivity analysis of the
bascine MFP  equation. Scarpetta  and Tressel (2002a) also used  aggregate GDP PPPs and found no significant differences in the key results
204.2.2  Regulatory indicators
To  check  the  influence  of  product  market  policies  on  MFP  we  extended  the  basic
productivity  regression  including  various  proxies  for  public  ownership  and  regulation.  A
problematic  aspect  of  our  regulation  data  is  that  they  involve  three  different  levels  of
regulatory  detail  each  covering  a  different  dimension  of regulation  (cross-country,  cross-
industry,  time-series).  The  economy-wide  indicators  have  the  largest  coverage  in  terms  of
regulatory  detail,  but  have  no time dimension.  The  industry-specific  indicators  have a large
industry  coverage  but  focus  on  a  restricted  set of regulations  and  have  no  time  dimension.
Finally,  indicators  for which  we  have  a full  time-series  have  less regulatory detail  and cover
only  trade  barriers  in  manufacturing  and  industry-level  regulation  in  a  subset  of the  non-
manufacturing  industries.  In  the  empirical  analysis  we  tried  to  exploit  all  the  information
available  in  the  data  by  combining  indicators  covering  different  dimensions  of regulation.
Moreover,  to  minimise  spuriousness  due  to  different  coverage  of regulatory  detail  across
industries,  throughout the empirical analysis we focus mostly on pattems and developments in
barriers to entry and public ownership.
Accordingly,  we estimated three versions of the productivity  model, which differ only by the
definition of the indicators of regulation  and public ownership  included among the covariates
(Table 4 provides the precise definitions):
*  In  the  first  set of regressions,  we  concentrated  on  overall  privatisation  and  economy-
wide  regulation  in  1998,  proxied  by  the  summary  indicator  as  well  as  by  its  main
components,  state control and  barriers  to entrepreneurship.  The  implicit assumption  in
these  regressions  is that the relative  position of each  country's  regulatory  environment
(captured  by the cross-country  indicator  of regulation)  changes  slowly and,  therefore,
end-of-period  values  are representative  of the cross-country  patterns  of regulation  over
the sample period.  To relax this latter assumption and account for both the cross-country
and  time-series  dimension  of regulation,  we  also  combined  the  1998  economy-wide
indicator  of  regulation  with  the  time-series  indicator  of  entry  liberalisation  that
summarises  reform  trends  in  seven  non-manufacturing  industries.  The  assumption here
is  that reforms  in  non-manufacturing  are  a  good  proxy  for  economy-wide  regulatory
trends.
*  In the second set of regressions,  we distinguish between regulation  in manufacturing  and
services.  To this  end,  we use  a time-series  indicator  of entry  liberalisation  that stacks
entry  liberalisation  in  services  and  entry  liberalisation  in  manufacturing,  the  latter
defined  as  the  combination  of changes  in  both  trade  and  domestic  non-manufacturing
regulations.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  entry  liberalisation  in  the  non-
manufacturing  sector also has an  impact on manufacturing  because  it affects the cost of
important  inputs  into  manufacturing  output.  45  In  these  regressions,  we  also  try  to
account  for different  patterns  of privatisation  in  manufacturing  and services.  However,
due  to the  lack  of sector-specific  data,  privatisation  in  manufacturing  was  proxied  by
economy-wide  privatisation trends. 46
*  In the third set of regressions,  we supplement  the indicators  of overall  privatisation and
entry  liberalisation  with  the  industry-level  indicators  of  barriers  to  entry.  In
45 Of course,  the cntry  iberalisation  indicator excludes changes  in public ownership.  which  are  accounted for by  the  pnvatisation indicator.  The
coverage of trade liberalisation in manufacturing  (captured by changes in tariff and non-tariff barners  to trade) provides an  industry dimension to the
indicator.
4  Information  on the sectoral distribution of public enterprises also including manufacturing  is  available only for some EU countries
21manufacturing  industries, we defined these indicators to include only (the period average
of)  industry-specific  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  and  economy-wide  administrative
burdens,  assuming  that  in  the OECD  countries  covered  in  our sample,  domestic  legal
barriers  to  entry  are  insignificant.47 In  service  industries,  barriers  to  entry  in  1998
included  industry-specific  legal  barriers  and  vertical  integration  (when  applicable),  as
well as economy-wide  (and industry-specific  when available) administrative  burdens.
[Table 4.  Variables used in the productivity regressions]
4.3  Empirical results
Table  5 presents  different  specifications  of a  baseline  equation  in  which  MFP  growth  is
regressed  only on  the  industry  leader,  the technology-gap  variable  and  human capital.  From
the  discussion  above,  all  specifications  control  for  country  and  industry  fixed  effects.
Moreover,  all equations  include  time dummies  to control  for common aggregate  shocks that
affect MFP  in all  countries.48 As  shown  in the first column  of the table, the Cook-Weisberg
test clearly signals  problems of heteroskedasticity  and, thus,  in all subsequent  regressions  we
present  robust  standard  errors.  Moreover,  our  cross-country  time-series  regressions  can  be
quite  sensitive  to  the  presence  of a  few  outliers  and  influential  observations  in the  sample
usually due to measurement errors  or specific  omitted variables.  In particular,  we identify 64
outlier  observations  in  the  sample-set  used  in  equation  1, which  were  removed  from  the
sample  used  in  all  other  equations.49 As  a  further  step  in  our  sensitivity  analysis  we  also
checked  for the  presence  of specific  industries  in  given  countries  that, because  of different
technological  features  or  simply  measurement  errors,  influence  significantly  the  overall
results.  On  the whole,  the results presented  below  are  robust to these  changes  in the sample
(see the appendix for more details).
The technology-gap  variable enters negatively and is significant at conventional  levels in all
specifications,  suggesting  that,  within  each  industry,  countries  that  are  further  behind  the
technological  frontier experience  higher  rates  of productivity  growth.  As  stressed  above,  we
also  allowed  the  coefficients  of the  productivity  leader  and  the  technology  gap  to  vary
between  manufacturing  and  service  industries.  Consistent  with  some  previous  results  (e.g.
Bernard and Jones,  1996a,b), there is evidence in the data of a more rapid technological  catch-
up in service  industries as compared  with manufacturing.50 This is particularly  the case for the
short-term  technological  passthrough  (i.e.  the  coefficient  of the  leader  country)  that  is  not
significant  in  manufacturing  industries,  but  also  over  the  longer  run  as  indicated  by  the
t  Drawing  on the OECD Inteniwltonal  RegulatioI  Datahbae,  Nicoletti  et al  (1999)  show  that such barriers are virtually absent  in the core OECD
countries covered by our sample
4' The  standard  F-tests for  the  presence of country.  industry and  time  dummies  strongly support (at  the  I per  cent level)  their inclusion  in  the
productivity equation  In the  sensitivity analysis, we also considered  country-specific time trends  Hov ever, none of the  estimated coefficients of
the  time  trend  was  statistically significant  (even  at  the  10  per  cent  level)  and,  thus.  these  trend  variables  were  not  included in  the  preferred
specifications.
49  The  identification  of outlier observations  is  based  on  the  %lisienitused  resdiuids  and  the  leverage  points  The  former  are  obtained  by
considenng a mean-shift outlier model in which the basic  equation is augmented  by a dummy  variable that  has the ,-th element equal to one and  all
other elements  zero  The studentised residual  is the i-statistics of the dummy  variable  The le, erage point is  identified by the diagonal  elements of
the  least-squared  projection matrix,  also  called the bat matrix  It proxies  the  distance between  the ith observation  and the  centre of the data (see
Belsey et al,  1980,  and Chaterjee  and Hadi, 1988)
ii  The  Wald tests for the equality of the coefficients  (on both  MFP growth  in the leader  country and the technology gap)  between manufacturing
industries and services are rejected  at the  I and 5 per cent level, respectively
22coefficient  of the  technology  gap  variable.5'  The  results  also  suggest  a  positive  effect  of
human capital on MFP, as would be expected.
[Table 5.  MFP regressions: selection of the baseline specification]
In  Table 6,  we extended  the  analysis  to check  the influence of economy-wide  privatisation
patterns and product  market regulations,  looking at both their direct impact and  their indirect
influence  through the rate of technological  catch up.  We consider  both the summary  indicator
of regulation  and two of its main comnponents,  the indicator of state control and that of barriers
to entrepreneurship.  Due to the  lack of the time dimension  for these indicators, their inclusion
in the MFP equation  comes  at the cost of dropping  the  country dummies.  Since the  omission
of unobservable  country-specific  influences  may  misleadingly  provide  explanatory  power  to
the regulatory  indicators,  we use the  standard  RESET  test to assess  the  extent of a possible
mis-specification  of the equation.52 In any event, we adjusted the standard errors and variance-
covariance  matrix  of the  estimators  for  cluster  level  effects  on  country-industry  using  the
procedure suggested by Moulton (1986).
The  results  in  Table  6  suggest  that  economy-wide  product  market  regulations  that  curb
competition  and private governance have  a negative effect on productivity,  mainly  by slowing
down technological  catch-up  (as suggested  by the positive  coefficient on the interaction term).
Both  the  overall  indicator of the  stringency  of regulaiion  and  its  component  measuring  the
extent of state control  in  the  business  sector  have  statistically  significant  coefficients  when
they are interacted  with the technological  gap.53 The effect of barriers  to entrepreneurship  on
productivity (not  shown  in  the table)  is  also negative  via the  catch-up  channel,  but  it  is  not
significant  at  conventional  levels.  The  coefficient  of the  privatisation  variable  is  generally
positive and significant at conventional  levels,  suggesting that countries  in which privatisation
was more extensive  benefited  from persistent  productivity  gains.  Of course,  since  the scope
for privatisation  is bound by the size of the public enterprise sector,  productivity gains via this
channel cannot be reproduced  indefinitely.
[Table  6.  MFP  regressions:  The  role  of  aggregate  product  market  regulation  and
privatisation]
The omission of country dummies, which was necessary to test the effects of economy-wide
regulations,  introduces  a possible  mis-specification  bias as  indicated  by the fact  that, relative
to  the  estimates  in  Table  4,  the  RESET  tests  are  somewhat  larger  and,  in  addition,  the
coefficient of human capital becomes  insignificant.54 To tackle this potential source of bias we
need to  account  for the  evolution  of regulation  over time  and  for the  patterns of regulation
across  industries  and  re-introduce  the  country-specific  effects.  Since  data  along  these  two
dimensions are incomplete (see  above), we proceed  in several steps  using different proxies. In
the  last column  of Table  6, we  considered  an  indicator  of the  stringency of product  market
regulation that combines the  1998 indicator of economy-wide regulation  with the time-varying
Si Using  cross-section  data  Bernard  and  Jones  (1996a.h)  found evidence  of convergence  in the  service  sector  but  not  in  manufactunng  Garcia
Pascual  and  Westermann  (2001).  using more  disaggregated  manufacturing  industries (along  the lines of this study) for some OECD countnes,  found
evidence of convergence in manufactunng
5  The RESET test is  the Ramsey  omitted vanable  regression  test
"  These  results are  broadly  consistent with  those of Blundell  el ail (1995,  1999)  and Nickell  (1996)  and  Cheung  and Garcia  Pascual  (2001),
although these papers use direct proxies for the degree of product market competition  uhich are subject to an endogeneity problem
5I  One  potential  influence  captured  by the  (omitted)  country-specific  effects  is related  to  labour adjustment  costs,  which  can  be  proxied by  the
indicator of the strictness of employment  protection legislation. In a sensitivity analysis we have  also included the  EPL indicator in the  productivity
equation but this does  not alter the  sign or statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the product  market  regulatory indicators  See also
Scarpetta and Tressel (2002b)
23indicator  of entry restrictions  in  non-manufacturing  industries."  The results  suggest  that  by
taking the dynamics of regulation  into account, the direct effect on  productivity dominates that
stemming from the interaction with the technology gap.
Combining  this  latter  result  with  those of the  previous  specifications,  we  are  tempted  to
conclude  that  the  long-run  costs  of  anti-competitive  regulation,  in  terms  of  foregone
productivity  improvements,  are  higher  in  countries  that  are  further  away  from  the
technological  frontier.  This  detrimental  effect  of  strict  product  market  regulations  on
productivity  catch-up  may result,  for  instance,  from  lower  incentives  for organisational  and
technological  change  in firms that are subject to state interference  (e.g.  price controls),  and, in
addition,  a narrower  scope for knowledge  spillovers  in  markets  where  entry  is restricted.  At
the  same  time,  by  increasing  competitive  pressures,  entry  liberalisation  has  a  generalised
effect on  industry productivity  in all countries,  regardless of their position with  respect to the
technology frontier."
As  a  second  step  in  our  assessment  of product  market  regulations,  while  controlling  for
country-specific  effects,  we  considered  entry  barriers  and  privatisation  separately  for
manufacturing  and for the service  sector. The results presented  in Table 7 tend to confirm the
positive  productivity effect of privatisation.  Similarly, the positive  effect of entry liberalisation
on  productivity  is  consistent  with  the  results  previously  obtained  using  the  time-varying
indicator  of economy-wide  regulation.  However,  the table  shows that this effect  is  (weakly)
significant  only  for  manufacturing,  suggesting  the  need  to  differentiate  further  the  analysis
across industries.
[Table 7. MFP regressions: The role of regulation  in manufacturing  and services]
To this end,  in the final step of our analysis we used industry-level  indicators, exploiting the
wide  cross-industry  dispersion  of  regulations.  We  focus  on  barriers  to  entry,  entry
liberalisation  and privatisation.  The results  in Table  8 seem to confirm  those presented  in the
previous two tables, but also add interesting insights. In particular, while entry liberalisation  in
services seems  to  have a  positive  effect  on  productivity  in the  whole economy  (equations  I
and  3),  the  effect  of  such  liberalisation  in  manufacturing  (proxied  by  easing  of  trade
restrictions)  is not significant.  At the  same time,  there is clear evidence  of a positive  effect of
privatisation  on  MFP.  The  results  also  suggest  that  restrictive  industry-specific  regulations
affect  productivity  mainly  via  the  process  of  adoption  and  technological  catch-up  in
manufacturing,  while,  a slightly positive direct effect of restrictive regulation  on MFP is found
in service  industries.
This  surprising  result for  the service  sector  may be  due  to the significant  heterogeneity  of
market and regulatory conditions characterising the individual  service  industries. For example,
in  industries where  the regulator  has extensive  control  on business  choices ((e.g.  railways),  it
is  possible  that  efficiency-enhancing  investments  can  be  forced  upon  the  regulated  firm  -
though  at the expense of higher regulated  prices. To shed light on the  potential role of industry
heterogeneity,  in  the  last  column  of the  table,  we  split  service  industries  into  a  group  of
activities  characterised  by  competitive  market  conditions  (trade, hotels  and restaurants,
financial intermediation and  real estate  and  business  activities)  and  a  residual  group
characterised  by a mixture of competitive  and  natural monopoly  elements (transport  and post
and telecommunications). However,  when  we  distinguish  between  the  two  sets  of service
55  Time-varying  entry restrictions are  defined  as  the  negative  of the  indicator of entry  liberalisation  to awoid  ambiguity  in  the interpretation of the
combined  indicator.
6 For additional evidence ofthe pr(Juctivity effects  of entry  liberalisation  at the  industry level,  see  Ginenc el a]  (2001)
24industries, the positive direct effect becomes  insignificant. At the same time, there  is evidence
that in competitive  service  industries the indirect effect of regulation is marginally  stronger in
statistical  terms.  This  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  regulations  affect  more  strongly
technology  adoption  in  competitive  markets  than  in  natural  monopoly  markets,  where
competitive  pressures  are  uniformly  weaker  and  neck-and-neck  competition  is  less
widespread.  This tentative  conclusion,  however,  requires further  investigation  at a finer level
of industry disaggregation.
[Table  8. MFP regressions:  The role of industry-specific  regulations  and regulatory reforms]
5  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper addressed two related policy-relevant  issues.  First, we asked whether the product
market  reforms  implemented  by OECD governments  over the  past two decades  have led  to
convergence  in  international  business  environments.  Using  a  novel  set of data  on  product
market  regulations  and  regulatory  reforms,  we  show  that  the  answer  to  this  question  is
nuanced.  On  the one  hand,  product  markets  of virtually  all  OECD  countries  have  become
more market friendly. On the other hand, policy approaches  have never been so different as  in
recent times, especially  (and  surprisingly)  within the  EMJ.  This is  because the  pace of reform
has varied significantly  across  countries that already had  very different  policy approaches  at
the beginning of the period. At the same time, market integration,  EC competition  policies and
the  EMU  apparently  did  not  provide  sufficient  constraints  and/or  incentives  to  European
governments  for harmonising their product  markets,  which  remained  largely  under the realm
of  domestic  policies  often  unfriendly  to  competition."  This  led  to  the  second  question
addressed  in  our  paper:  can  these  diverging  patterns  of reform  contribute  to  explain  the
puzzling  disparities  in  growth  outcomes  over the  past  decade,  when  a  number of countries
halted  and,  sometimes,  reversed  the  long-standing  productivity  slowdown  while  others
continued  along  a  downward-sloping  productivity  path?  Our  empirical  analysis  tends  to
provide  a  positive  answer  to  this question.  Both  the bivariate  and  multivariate  evidence  we
present  point  to  significant  links  between  product  market  policies  and  productivity
performance.  We identified two main channels.
First,  the  lower  entry  barriers  and  state  control  the  faster  the  process  of  catch-up  to
best-practice technologies  in manufacturing  industries. This  has the ancillary  implication  that
countries  that  are  laggards  in  both  technology  adoption  and  reform  are  likely  to  reap  the
largest  productivity  gains  from  state  retrenchment  and  liberalisation  of markets  that  are
potentially competitive.  To the extent  to which  Europe has accumulated  a technology  gap in
some high-tech  industries  (e.g.  ICT-related  industries),  this result  points to the importance  of
further regulatory  reforms aimed at easing entry conditions  and reducing state control. At the
same  time, we  also  find  evidence that  entry  liberalisation  involves  productivity  gains  in  all
countries, regardless  of their position with respect to the technology  frontier.
Second,  we  found  evidence  to  suggest that the process  of privatisation  involves  additional
direct productivity gains.  This is consistent with theories pointing to the increased  competitive
pressures and  entrepreneurial  incentives  stemming  from changes  in  ownership.  However,  as
often  argued,  the gains  from  privatisation  may  depend  on  whether the  state maintains  large
stakes  in  such  privatised  companies  (as  in  the case  of large  energy,  telecommunication  and
" The so-called Cardiff process is  mainly a monitonng  initiative that does not see  an enlargement  of the  EC role or stnngent guidelines on product-
market  reforms  by member governments.
25transport  companies  in  Europe) or not.  Even  more  importantly,  efficiency  gains may depend
on whether privatisation  is accompanied by adequate promotion of competition  in the markets
in  which privatised companies operate.  These are, however, issues that could  not be tackled in
our analysis and require  further empirical work.
Bearing  in  mind  the  illustrative  nature  of  any  policy  simulation  based  on  aggregate
regressions, our  empirical  results  seem  to  suggest  sizeable  benefits  from  further  progress in
reforming  the  regulatory  environment  and  in  reducing  the  role  of  the  state  in  business
activities.  In  particular,  if taken  at  face  value,  a  gradual  (over  ten  years)  move  to  the
OECD-wide  average  share  of state-owned  firms  in  total  value  added  is  estimated  to  boost
annual  MFP productivity  growth  by about  0.7  percentage  points  in some European  countries,
most  notably  Portugal,  Greece,  Austria,  France  and  Italy  that  still  have  a  large  stake  of
business activities  in public hands. This acceleration  in productivity  growth could last as long
as  the  privatisation  process  continues  and the  economy  has  not yet reached  the new  steady-
state productivity  growth path.  Clearly,  the productivity gains that can potentially  be obtained
through  state  retrenchment  are  large,  but  they  are  also  bounded  by  the  size  of the  public
enterprise  sector.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  we  found  that  entry  liberalisation  aimed  at
moving the level of barriers  to entry in some European  countries towards  the OECD average
over a ten-year time  horizon might have a two-fold effect.  First, entry liberalisation  in service
industries  is estimated to boost annual MFP growth  in the overall  business sector by about 0.1-
0.2  percentage  points  in  countries  like  Portugal,  Greece  and  Italy.  Second,  there  is  also  an
indirect effect of the removal  of trade  and administrative  barriers  to entry  in excess of those
existing  in  the  average  OECD  country.  This  effect  depends  on  the  technology  gap  that
countries have accumulated  in some heavily  regulated  manufacturing  industries:  such reforms
are  estimated  to  boost  manufacturing-wide  annual  productivity  growth  by  0.1-0.2  in  some
European countries and most notably Germany,  France, Italy and  Greece.
All  in  all,  these  findings  seem to  offer  some  insights  into  the  current  debate  about  policy
reform  in the EU area.  Evidence of large  differences  in regulatory patterns within Europe and,
even  more  importantly,  divergence  in  the  pace  of regulatory  reforms  raises the  issue  as  to
whether appropriate  instruments are set in  place to favour  the harmonisation  of the  European
business environment  and make Europe  "the most competitive and dynamic  knowledge-based
economy  in  the  world"  as  stated  at  the  Lisbon  Summit  in  2000.  Indeed,  while  the  single
market agenda  is  well  underway  and  subject  to  a close  monitoring  process  (e.g.  the Single
Market Scoreboard), the  review  of product  market  regulations  and  regulatory  reform  in  EU
countries,  now part of the Cardiff process,  probably  requires  further efforts. Likewise,  despite
efforts  to  improve  transparency  and  enforce  discipline,  the  degree  of state  intervention  has
remained  highly  differentiated  across  the  EU  states,  with  potentially  negative  competitive
effects across EU countries.
We  cannot  conclude  this  paper  without  a  word  of caution  on  the  limits  of the  available
information  about  regulations  and  state  intervention.  For  example,  data  limitations  did  not
make  it  possible  to  estimate  accurately  the  relative  contributions  of  industry-specific
privatisation and  entry liberalisation  to productivity  improvements.  This calls  for further work
on  characterising  public  ownership  at the  industry  level.  Moreover,  our  characterisation  of
entry  regulation  in  manufacturing  could  not account  for  important  cross-country  and  cross-
industry  differences  related  to  standards,  quality  control,  environmental  regulations  and
industry-specific  administrative  burdens,  which  may  have  an  important  influence  on
productivity.  Here  too,  a  further  effort to  quantify  differences  in  regulation  across  countries
26would  be  needed.  Finally,  while  great  care  was  taken  to  assess  and  quantify differences  in
service regulation  across countries  and time,  no long-run  effects of entry  barriers on MFP  in
these  industries  could  be  detected  from  the empirical  analysis.  This  result  runs  against  the
abundant  evidence  pointing  to  efficiency  improvements  after  the  liberalisation  of service
industries such as telecommunications.  We believe that our failure  to detect such  effects in the
data  may partly depend  on  the  poor quality of the productivity  data  for services,  which are
marred by inaccurate  measurement  of both (or either) inputs  and outputs. Many of the studies
dealing  with  the  effects  of  increased  competition  in  specific  industries  used  ad  hoc
productivity measures (e.g.  in physical units or based on frontier analysis), while we based our
multi-factor  productivity measures on standard national  accounts data and defined it uniformly
across manufacturing  and service  industries. This points to a trade-off, often faced  by analysts,
between  the wish to broaden the analysis  to a cross-industry/cross-country  panel,  which  can
only  be  done  by relying on  standardised  data,  and  the wish  to  quantify  phenomena that  are
grounded  in  microeconomic relationships  and  whose evidence  may be clouded  by excessive
generalisation.
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GDP  Total hours  Labour productivity  Capital deepening  MFP
19B0-1990'  1990-2000'  1996-2000'  1980-1990'  1990-2000'  1996-2000'  1980-1990'  1990-2000'  1996-2000'  1980-1990'  1990-2000'  1996-2000'  1980-1990'  1990.2000'  1998-2000'
Unied States  33  3 6  41  2 0  2 2  25  13  14  16  2 9  25  30  09  11  13
Japan  41  17  10  07  -06  -09  33  23  19  65  51  43  22  10  07
Germany  23  1.9  21  -02  .01  05  25  19  16  37  32  30  1S  09  08
France  23  21  26  -09  01  08  32  20  18  40  31  27  19  10  1 1
Italy  25  t9  21  0t  -0t  05  24  20  16  32  30  30  15  10  07
UniledKingdom  31  20  28  07  07  12  23  14  15  28  28  28  t0  07  10
Canada  27  31  4 0  15  18  2 4  12  iS  16  3 5  14  0 9  0 6  13  17
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Sweden  21  24  34  05  02  15  16  22  19  20  15  10  14
Switzerland  17  0 5  01  01  0  3  2 7
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Weighted average
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adjustment apples  an extended veruion of the  Hodnck-Prescol filter where  the well-known  and-ot-sample  pmoblem  is minimised by prolonging the  bme-senes  out of  sampte using OECD  medium tetm
projections  See Scarpetta et al  (2000)  for a sensitivity  analysts using different smoothing  procedurnes
2  1983-1990 tor Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece  and Ireland,  1985-1990 tor Austna and  Now Zealand.  1986-1  990 tor Portugal
3  1991-1996  for Switzerland,  1990-1997 for Austna.  Belgium,  New Zealand, 1990.1998 for  Ireland, Korea and  Netherlands.  1990-1999  for Denmark,  Greece,Japan  and  United Kingdom
4  1996-1997  for Austria,  Belgium,  New Zealand.  1996-1998 for  Ireland, Korea  and Netherlands.  1996-1999 tor Denmark,  Greece,Japan and United Kingdom
5  1983-1990  for Belgium, Denmark,  Greece and  Ireland,  1985-1990 tar  Austna and New Zealand,  1987-1990 for  United Kingdom
6 1991.1996  tor Switzerland.  1990-1996  for Ireland  and Sweden,  1990-1997 forAustria, Belgium,  New  Zealand and United Kingdom,  1990-1998 tor Netherlands,  1990-1999 for Australia,
Denmark. France.  Greece,  Italy  and Japan
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Indicator  Coverage  Period
Sectoral detail  Regulatory areas
State control,  barriers to
entrepreneurship
Summary of general-purpose  Economic regulabon,
Economy6wide regulation  and industry-specific  administrative regulation  1998
regulations
Barriers to international trade
and investment
Aggregate business sector and
Privatisatfon  seven 2 or 3-diit non-  Public ownership2 1975-1998
manufacturing industnes
Industry-specific barriers to
intemational trade in  . . 1988,  1993,
seventeen 2-digit  Tan  and non-tan  bamers  1996
Industry-level  regulation  manufacturing  industries3
Industry-specific regulations in  Public ownership,  barriers to
seven 1 or 2-digit non-  entry5, constraints to business  1998
manufacturing  industnes4 operation,  price controls
Summary of industry-level  Pubic ownership,  bariers to
RegulatoryrefonSn  regulations in seven 2 or 3-digit  oners  bantrs  1975-1998
non-manufacturing  industries  entry ,  price controls
1. All indicators are increasing in the degree of restictions imposed on market mechanisms  See appendix for further
details on sources, definitions, coverage and aggregabon procedures
2  The business sector measure proxies the share of public-controlled firms in non-agricultural business sector GDP.
The indicator for non-manufactunng  industnes summarises the degree of public control in each industry.
3. Based on 6-digit data on tariff and non-tarff barriers. See appendix for details on aggregabon procedures.
4.  Based on data for fifteen 2 or 3-digit non-manufacturing  industries. See appendix for details on the coverage  of indus
and areas of regulation.
5  In  network industnes, includes the degree of vertical integration and the market share of the incumbent.TaMb  e  Variables used In fegaslom'
Variable  Definition  Sampb
A AW-PLeadar'  Growthn  rate  In  mufiuhftaor  produtnty of leder  country  17  mnufctumg and  6 non-arnufacturing industrIes.  18  OECD countiras,  1984-1998
Todmx*"Gspp  Log diffi eno of MFP  level to  MFP  tsel of Wader country  17  mnuhfacurng and  6 non-manufacunng
Tachnedegy  Gap 0 Log  diferanon of MFP  lead to MFP  level  of leader  m  indues, 18  OECD  counties, 1984-1998
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33Table 5.  MFP regressions: selection of baseline specification
Dependent vanable: AMFPilt  i
1  2  3  4
Constant  -0.02  -0.02  -0.08  -0.09
(0 02)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)
AMFP Leader, t  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.01)  (o 01)
Technology gapit-  -0.06  -0.03  -0.03
(0.01)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Human capital  jt  0.12  0.14
(0.07)  (0.07)
AMFP  Leader1j  (MAN)  -0.01
(0.01)
AMFP Leader;, (SERV)  0.05
(0.02)
Technology gap i.  (MAN)  -0.03  -
(0.004)
Technology gap ,.t- (SERV)  -0.05
(O  01)
Number of observations  3250  3186  3101  3101
Heteroskedasticityl  1368.04
Reset'  83.15  0 81  0  35  0.37
denotes  significance at the 1%  level;  at 5%  level; *  at  10%  level.
Robust standard errors (from eq.2) in parentheses.
Sample are adjusted for outliers from equation 2 onwards  See main text.
All equations include country, industry and time dummies.
1. Cook and Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity.
2. Ramsey's omitted-variable test:  F-test on the joint significance of the additional terms
in a model augmented with the second, third and fourth powers of the predicted values
of the original model
34Table 6  MFP regresons: The role of aggregte Indicators of regulation and privatisatlon
Dependen  variable  AMFP  i
1  2  3  4  5  6
Constant  .0.10 _  4.005  40.01  .0.01  -0.01  40.11
(0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0 01)  (0.04)
AMFP Leaderjt (MAN)  -0.01  .0.01  -0.01  .0.01  .0.01  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0 01)
AMFP Leaderj,  (SER\)O  0.0  0.0O  - 0.08 - 0.07  - 0.08  - 0.08  -
(0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0 01)  (0 01)  (0 02)
Technology gap  (MAN)  .0.03  4  0.02  4  0.02  4  0.04  .0.03  4  0.03  -
(0.00)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (O  01)  (O  01)  (O  01)
Tedinology gap  (SERV)  -0.05  -O.0 - .004 - -0.06  - 0.08  -0.05
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0 01)  (0 01)
Human  capital Ij,  0.1t  - 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.17
(0.07)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0 01)  (0.07)
RegulationI  .0.01  0.01
(0.005)  (0.01)
RegulaionI  Tedinology gap r  0.02  -
(0.01)
Regulation i (sete contol  -0.01  0.01
( 01)  (O  01)
Regulaion  (bariers to entrep)  0.00  0.00
(0.01)  (0.01)
Regulation,  (state control)  Technology gap  0.  0.02
(O 01)
Regulsion it (time-varying)  40.08
(00 21)
Regula*ion I (time-varying)  *Technology  gap  0.01
(O 011)
Overril privatisaton.,  0.25  0.16  0.17  0.13  1*  0.4  0.1 6
(0.10)  ( 07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (007)  (010)
Nunnber of observations  3101  3101  3101  3101  3101  3101
Country dummIes  Yet  No  No  No  No  Yes
Reset'  0.42  2.15  2.41 *  1.72  259 *  0 56
denotes signtfaance  atthe 1%  level:-  at5%  evel,  at 10%  eveI
Robust standard ers in equation I  and 6.  adjusted standard erros fbr dustring In  equatons 2-.
Samples are adjusted fbr outlier.  See main tet.
All equations indude industry and time dummies.
Indicators of privatsatn messu-e the diange In  public ownership and Indicator  of  product  market regulation  are Increasing in the
degree of restricions Imposed on market mechanisms.
1 Remseys omitted-varflabl  test: F-test on  hejolnt significance of the additonal terms
In  a model augmented withthe second, third  and fouth powes ofthe predicted values
of the orIginal model.
35Table 7. MFP regressions: The role of regulations In manufacturing and services
Dependent variable: AMFP II  t
1  2  3
Constant  -0.09  -0.09  -0.09
(0.04)  (0.4  (0.04)
AMFP Leader I  t (MAN)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
(0.01)  (O  01)  (O  01)
AMFP  Leader,,  (SERV)  0.08  0.08  0.09
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Technology gap It.  (MAN)  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03
(0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Technology gap,  (SERV)  -0.05  -0.05  -0.06
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Human  capital  j t  0.15  0.15  0.15
(0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Entry liberalisation  -0.02  -0.02
(0.02)  (0.02)
Entry liberalisationit  ^ Technology gap i;t.  0.01
(0.02)
Entry liberalisation (MAN)t  0.05
(0.02)
Entry liberalisation (SERV) It  0.01
(0.02)
Entry liberalisation (MAN)t  Technology gap il I  0.001
(0.02)
Entry liberalisation  (SERV)  tTechnology gap iltI  -0.01
(0.03)
Privatisation Ijt  0.09  0.09  0.09
(0.05)  (O.OS)  (0.05)
Number of observations  3101  3101  3101
Reset'  0.44  0.43  0.52
denotes significance at the 1%  level; ^ at 5% level;  at 10%  level.
Robust standard errors.
Samples are adjusted for outliers. See main text.
All equations include country, industry and time dummies.
Indicators of privatisation measure the change in public ownership and indicators of entry liberalisation
measure the easing of restrictions imposed on marked  mechanisms.
1. Ramsey's omitted-variable test:  F-test on the joint significance of the additional terms
in a model augmented with the second, third and fourth  powers of the predicted values
of the onginal model
36Table 8. MFP regressions: The role of industry-specific
regulations and regulatory  refoffns
Dependentvanable-  AMFP ,,t
1  2  3
Constant  -0.10  -0.09  -0.09
(0  05)  (0.05)  (0.05)
AMFP  Leader (MAN)it  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
(0.01)  (0 01)  (0.01)
AMFP  Leader (SERV)jt  0.08  0.08  0.08
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Technology gap  (MAN) ij  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04
(0 01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Technology gap (SERV) I  j  4.06  -0.05  -0.06
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Human capital Ij  0.13  0.14  0.14
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)
Barriers to entry  (MAN) ii  0.04  0.03  0.03
(0.02)  (0.02)  (O  02)
Barriers  to entry (MAN) I ^Technology gap j  0.04  0.04  0.04
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Barriers to entry (SERV),  0.04  0.04
(0.02)  (O  02)
Barriers to entry (SERV)  (non-comp),,  0.04
(0.03)
Barriers to entry (SERV)  (comp)  i  0.04
(0.03)
Barriers to entry (SERV)ij  'Technology  gap , t.  0.02  0.02
(0.02)  (  02)
Barriers to entry (SERV) (non-comp)  I  Technology gap 1 j 1 0.049
(0.06)
Barriers to entry (SERV)  (comp)  I *  Technology gap,,.1 0.024
(0.02)
Entry liberalisation  (SERV) it  0.04"  0.04  0.04
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Entry liberalisation (MAN)  It  0.04
(0.10)
Overall privatisation It  0.23 "  0.24  0.24
(0.  10)  (0.10)  (0.10)
Number of observations  3093  3093  3093
Reset'  1.92  1 51  1.67
denotes significance at the 1  %  level;  at 5%  level;  at 10%  level
Robust standard errors.
Samples are adjusted for outliers  See main  text.
All equations include country,  industry and  time dummies.
Indicators of privatisation measure the change in public ownership; entry liberalisation  measures the easing
of restnctions  imposed on market mechanisms;  and entry barriers the strincency of such regulations.
1.  Ramsey's omitted-variable  test: F-test on the joint significance of the additional terms
in a  model  augmented with the second, third and fourth powers  of the predicted  values
of the original model.
37Figure 1. Regulatory reform
Indicator of regulatory reform  in seven non-manufacturing  industries
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38Figure 2.  Multifactor productivity acceleration  and product market regulation
Difference  in average MFP growth rate between  1990-2000 and  1980-19901
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2  This is the simple average of the indicator of state control  and barriers to entry and excludes barriers  to trade and
investment
3  The scale of indicators is 0-6 from least to  most restrictive.  See Nicoletti  et al  (1999)
39Figure 3. Privatisation and  regulatory reform  in OECD countries'
Panel A. Public ownership and privatisation
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I  See  annex for details
2 Authors' calculations  based on  UJNCTAD data.  Aggregation  of 2-digit tariffs  with sectoral  value-added  weights
2  Simple  average of idicators for  gas and  electricity  supply,  postal services,telecoms, airtransport, railways,road  freight.
Depending on the industry  the indicators cover  barrers to  entry,  public  ownership, market  structure,  vertical integration
and price  controls  Europe data are weighted average  (1995  GDP PPPs) of Austria, Belgium,  Denmark, Ftnland,  Germnany,
Greece,  Ireland, Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway, Portugal,  Spain. Sweden  and Switzerland  data
Source  See Annex
40Figure 4. Regulatory environment in 19981
Panel A. Regulation  in non-manufacturing industries in  19982
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I. See  annex  for details
2  Depending  on the  industry, the indicators cover public ownership,  barrers to entry,  price control,  restrictions to business
operation,  admninistrative  burdens, market  structure and  vertical integration.  Indicators are increasing  with  restrictions  to comnpetition.
3  Includes  trade and  FDI restrictions.
4  Includes  barriers  to competition and state control.
Source .See Annex.
4 1APPENDIX
1. REGULATION  DATA AND INDICATORS
Four  sets  of regulatory  indicators  are  used  in  the  paper.  These  describe  economy-wide
regulation;  industry-level  regulation;  regulatory  reform  and  privatisation.  Economy-wide
regulation  covers  different  regulatory  areas  (e.g.  state  control,  barriers  to  entrepreneurship,
administrative  regulation)  and  summarises,  for  each  area  and  overall,  general-purpose  and
industry-specific  regulations  into a single indicator that describes  the situation  in each country
in 1998. Industry-level  regulations concern barriers to international  trade in manufacturing and
a  wide  set  of regulatory  areas  (including  public ownership,  barriers  to entry,  constraints  to
business  operation  and  price  controls)  in  non-manufacturing  industries.  The  manufacturing
indicators cover the  1988,  1993 and  1996 periods. The non-manufacturing  indicators cover  16
industries  in  1998 and 7 industries over the 1975-1998  period. Regulatory reform  is defined  as
trade liberalisation  and administrative  simplification  in the manufacturing  sector, and market-
oriented regulatory changes  in the 7 non-manufacturing  industries for which historical data on
regulation  is available.  Privatisation has a more restricted  focus and aims at summarising  into
a  single  time-series  indicator  the  evolution  of public  ownership.  in  the  aggregate  business
sector over the 1975-1998  period.  Figure A.1  provides  an overall taxonomy of the economy-
wide  and  industry-level  regulatory  indicators.  More  details  on  each  of these  indicators  are
provided  below.
[Figure A. 1.  A map of indicators of regulation]
1.1. Economy-wide  regulation
The  indicators  of economy-wide  regulation  are  drawn  from  Nicoletti  et al.  (1999),  who
describe  in detail data sources, assumptions and methodologies.  These indicators  are based on
detailed data collected by the OECD from national  sources concerning  regulations  potentially
restricting private  governance and competition (the OECD International  Regulation Database
is  available  on line at http://www.oecd.org/EN/document/O,,EN-document-491-nodirectorate-
no-1-18275-2,00.html).  Nicoletti et al.  (1999)  grouped the data  in two main regulatory  areas:
inward-oriented  regulations  and barriers to trade and  investment. Inward-oriented  regulations
were  further  subdivided  into  two  alternative  sets  of areas:  state  control  and  barriers  to
entrepreneurship;  or economic and administrative regulation.
In  this  paper,  the  economy-wide  indicator  of  administrative  regulation  was  used  to
supplement  industry-level  information  about  trade  barriers  in  manufacturing  and  as a proxy
for  industry-level  regulation  in  the  Hotels and Restaurants industry,  for  which  no  other
regulatory  information  was  available.  By  way of illustration,  Table  A.1  describes  the  basic
composition of this indicator and the various aggregation  steps.
[Table A. 1. Indicator of administrative regulation:  basic components and aggregation steps]
Summary  indicators,  for  each  regulatory  area  and  overall,  were  computed  aggregating
individual regulations  with weights derived from factor analysis.  This technique was used as a
descriptive  device  to  identify  clusters  of  regulatory  provisions  belonging  to  the  same
(unobserved)  regulatory  sub-areas,  yielding  the  taxonomy  of  economy-wide  indicators
42sketched  in  the  upper  part  of  Figure  A.1.58  For  instance,  regulations  falling  under  the
administrative  regulation  umbrella  were  subdivided  into  administrative  burdens  on  startups
and regulatory and administrative opacity (Table  A. 1), those  under the state control  umbrella
were  subdivided  among the two sub-areas  of public ownership  and government  involvement
in  business  operation,  etc.  Regulations  belonging  to  the  same  sub-area  (i.e.  attached  to the
same  unobserved  principal  component)  were  then  aggregated  using their  loadings  in  each
principal  component.  Thus,  the weight  of individual  regulations  in  each  sub-area  indicator
reflects  its contribution  to the cross-country  variance  of the data,  with more weight  given to
regulations  that  are  more  variable  across  countries.  The  final  aggregation  into  a  global
indicator  of product  market  regulation  was  made  by  simple  averaging  of the  area-wide
indicators  resulting  from  factor analysis.  As  shown  in the  main  text,  the  resulting  country
rankings,  along both the global and area-wide  indicators of regulation,  are robust to changes  in
the weighting procedure.
The  country rankings obtained  for the economy-wide  indicators are  also broadly consistent
with the  rankings  obtained  by other  authors  using  different  data  and methodologies  (Table
A.2).  Though differences  in  the ranking of individual  countries exist,  the overall  correlation
among  the  indices  shown  in  the  table  is  strong  and  significant  at  conventional  levels.
Moreover,  if we  define  in each  ranking  the first  six countries  as  liberal  and the  last  six  as
regulated,  the overlap  is  remarkable.  As suggested  in the main text,  most differences  can  be
traced  to  the  "subjective"  nature  of the  data  used  in  the  alternative  indicators,  which  are
mostly based on results of business surveys.
[Table A.2. Subjective  and objective  measures of economy-wide  product market regulation,
late  1990s]
1.2. Industry-level regulation
The  indicators of industry-level  regulation  used in the  paper cover the manufacturing  and
(most of the) utilities and marketable  service industries at the 2 or higher digits of aggregation
(according to the ISIC Rev 3 classification).  In network industries -- such as utilities, post and
telecommunications  and railways -- the basic data covered regulatory and market conditions in
different  (vertical  or horizontal)  segments  of the  industries (e.g.  gas production,  distribution
and supply;  or regular and express mail).  Table A.3  provides  the coverage and sources of the
regulatory data for the industry aggregates used in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper.
[Table A.3. Industry-level  indicators: sources and sample coverage]
Depending  on  the  industry,  the  regulatory  areas  covered  by the  industry-level  indicators
include barriers to entry, trade or FDI restrictions,  public ownership, price controls, constraints
to business  operation,  vertical integration  and market  concentration  (Table A.4).  Differences
in coverage  depend on both the availability of data and the  relevance  of the regulatory areas
for each individual industry (e.g. in OECD countries,  public ownership is not a relevant factor
in the road freight  industry,  and vertical  integration  is  generally  not relevant for professional
services).  In network industries,  measures of industry  and market  structure were  included  as
proxies  for  de facto entry  barriers  for  new  service  providers.  However,  to  avoid  potential
" Factor  analysis  is a  statistical  technique  aimed at  finding  the  minimum  number  of factors  that  explain  the  maximum  amount  of the  overall
covariance of the observed variables  Each observed  variable  is assigned to the  factor that it mostly contributes to determine.  Kline (1994)  provides
a  good  illustration  of  factor  analysis  techniques  Kaufmann  el  al  (1999)  used  factor  analysis  as  a  statistical  device  to aggregate  and  make
probabilistic statements  about "subjective" measures of regulation.
43endogeneity  problems  market  concentration  was  netted  out  of the  indicators  used  in  the
econometric analysis of MFP determinants  (Section 4).
[Table A.4. Industry-level  indicators:  coverage of regulatory areas]
The  precise  definition  of each  of the  regulatory  areas  also  varies  across  industries  as a
function of both industry characteristics  and data availability.  The main items included  in the
industry-specific  definitions are  summarised  in Table  A.S.  Countries were  ranked along each
item  according  to  a  scale  going  from  least  to  most  restrictive  of private  governance  or
competition. Further details on the industry-specific  items included  in regulatory areas and the
criteria used to rank countries along each  item can  be found in Gonenc  et al. (2001), Boylaud
and Nicoletti  (2001a,  2001b,  2001c),  Gonen,  and Nicoletti (2001)  and Findlay  and Warren
(2000).
[Table A.5. Definitions of regulatory areas by industry]
Aggregating  individual  regulations  into  industry-level  regulatory  indicators  involved  three
main steps:
*  Within  each  industry,  regulatory  items  included  into  a  single  regulatory  area  were
aggregated.  For example,  an  indicator  of barriers  to entry was  generated  for the  road
freight  industry  by  aggregating  the  sub-indicators  concerning  industry-specific
administrative  burdens,  price  floors,  licensing  requirements  and  involvement  of
professional  associations  (see  Table  A.5).  At  this  step,  the  aggregation  procedure
differed  across  industries  depending  on  the  number  of items  available  for describing
regulation  in the industry.  Weighted  averages  were made  in industries where regulatory
information  was  abundant  (e.g.  road  freight,  retail  distribution,  air transport,  water
transport, banking,  professional  services). In other industries, either aggregation was not
needed,  because  the  relevant  regulatory  areas  were  described  by  a  single  item  (e.g.
monopoly,  duopoly or free entry  in mobile telephony),  or a simple average  was made
(e.g.  existence of third  party  access,  existence  of a wholesale  pool  and  thresholds  for
consumer choice in electricity generation).
*  Indicators  for each  regulatory  area  were  aggregated  within  an industry  (across  industry
segments)  or industry  aggregate  (across lower digit  industries).  For instance,  indicators
of barriers to entry  in the electricity,  gas and water industries were  aggregated  to obtain
an  indicator of barriers  to  entry for the electricity,  gas and  water  sector.  Aggregation
across  vertical  industry  segments  (e.g. gas  production,  transmission  and  distribution)
was  made  by simple  average.  Aggregation  across  horizontal  industry  segments  (e.g.
mobile and fixed telephony) was made by weighted average,  with weights given by the
share of each industry segment  in total sales.  Aggregation  across  higher digit industries
(e.g. electricity,  gas and water)  was also made by weighted average,  with weights  given
by average OECD employment  shares (since disaggregated  data for sales or value added
are often lacking).  When  regulatory indicators were missing for some of the higher digit
industries  included in an  industry aggregate (e.g.  Wholesale Trade in the Wholesale and
Retail  Trade  aggregate,  or  Insurance  in  the  Financial Intermediation  aggregate)
regulation  in  the  industry  aggregate  was  proxied  by  the  weighted  average  of the
available industry-level  indicators in that aggregate (Table A.4).
*  Finally,  summary  indicators  of  industry-level  regulation  (including  several  regulatory
areas)  were  computed  aggregating  the  indicators  for each  regulatory  area  by means  of
weighted  or  simple  averages,  depending  on  the  amount  of  regulatory  information
originally available. For example, the summary  indicator for road freight is the weighted
44average of the indicators of barriers to entry,  constraints on business operation  and trade
and FDI restrictions.
The computation  of trade barriers  in  manufacturing  industries  deserves  a special  mention
because  we directly used  data on tariff rates and frequency of non-tariff barriers  rather  than
qualitative information  on regulations.  Original  data are at the 6-digit level of the Hannonised
System  (HS)  classification  and  include  the  number  of tariff lines  for  each  6-digit  industry
(usually  one). Tariffs  are  defined as the ad valorem tariff rates  applied to the most  favoured
nation.  Conversely,  the indicator  of non-tariff barriers  is a  frequency  ratio:  it corresponds  to
the proportion of tariff lines to which  non-tariff barriers apply.  Indicators of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers  for  1988,  1993 and  1996  have been  aggregated  into indicators  for 2-digit ISIC
Rev.  3  industries  using  import-weights  corresponding  to  1998  trade  flows  across  OECD
countries as obtained  from OECD  Foreign Trade  Statistics.  To avoid endogeneity  problems,
import-weighted  trade barrier indicators use the sum of all imports of OECD countries instead
of national  imports as  weights.  More  specifically,  the aggregation  procedure  that  is  used for





where T stands for the trade barrier indicator and imp for average OECD-wide  imports.
A  variant of this aggregation  formula  was  used  for  EU countries,  where  import-weighted
trade  barriers  are  equal,  reflecting  common  trade  policies  across  Member  states.  The
information  arising  from  cross-country  import  differentials  (net of  intra-EU  imports)  was
exploited  to generate  sample variation  in trade  barriers  within the EU, under the  assumption
that identical tariff or non-tariff measures  have a different economic  impact (e.g.  in terms of
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where IMP stands  for  actual  (net of intra-EU)  imports  of the countryj.  Therefore,  normal
weights  for  6-digit  industries  were  increased  or  decreased  of a percentage  that  reflects  the
relative importance of that sector for countryj with respect to the EU average.
Using  the  two  digit  indicators  of  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers,  overall  measures  for
manufacturing were obtained using two-digit production weights for 1988.
The main sources for the industry-level  indicators were: 59
S9 Other secondary sources  mclude the International Energy Agency,  the Universal Postal  Umon and the National Economic  Research Associates
45*  The  OECD:  Regulatory Reform,  Privatisation and Competition Policy (1992);  The
OECD International Regulation Database; OECD Roundtables  on  competition and
regulation, various issues; OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, various  issues; OECD
Economic  Studies,  n.32  (2001)  (and  background  OECD  Economics  Department
Working  Papers  n.  251,  237,  238,  254,  255);  OECD Report on Regulatory Reform
(1997).
*  UNCTAD:  Trade  Analysis  and Information  System  (TRAINS),  CD  Rom,  Winter
1998/1999  (version 6.0).
*  The  European Conference  of Ministers  of Transportation:  Rail Restructuring in Europe
(1998);  Regulatory Reforms  in the  Transport Sector (1987);  Competition Policy and
Deregulation  of  Road Transport  (1990); Railway  Reform (2001).
*  The  World  Bank: Industry Structure and Regulation in Infrastructure:  a Cross-Country
Survey (1996).
*  The European Commission: Liberalisation  of  Network Industries  (1999) (and background
documents); Green Paper  on Postal  Services (1993)
*  Center  for  the  Study  of Regulated  Industries/Privatisation  International:  1. Lewington
(ed.), Utility Regulation (1997).
*  Australian  Productivity  Commission:  G.  McGuire,  M.  Schuele  and  Smith,
"Restrictiveness  of international  trade in  maritime  services",  Productivity Commission
Staff Research Paper  (2000);  K. Kalijaran,  "Restrictions  on trade in business  services",
Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper  (2000);  D. Nguyen-Hong,  "Restrictions
on  trade  in  professional  services",  Productivity Commission  Staff Research Paper
(2000); Trade & Assistance Review 1998-99 (1999).
1.3. Regulatory  reform
Using the above sources,  it was possible to collect information  on historical  developments  in
regulation  over the  1975-1998  period  for a subset  of the  industries  covered  by the  industry-
level  indicators. These data covered  regulatory  and market  developments  in seven  energy and
service  industries:  gas,  electricity,  post,  telecommunications  (mobile  and  fixed  services),
passenger  air  transport,  railways  (passenger  and  freight  services)  and  road  freight.  As
illustrated  in  Table A.4, the coverage of regulatory  areas  was more  limited than for the  1998
indicators,  as  were  also the items  included  in  each  area. Aggregate  time-series  indicators  of
regulatory  reformn  (in  the  different  regulatory  areas  and  overall)  for  the  non-manufacturing
sector were constructed  by taking a simple  average of the  summary  indicators for  the seven
industries.
Similarly, the historical  information about tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade was used to
construct  an  indicator  of trade  liberalisation  in the  manufacturing  sector.  To this  end,  the
production-weighted  tariff and  non-tariff  barriers  for the  manufacturing  aggregate  in  1988,
1993 and 1996 (see above) were interpolated  and their end-of-period value was extrapolated to
1998.
1.4.  Privatisation
The main sources for the time-series indicator of public ownership were the following:
*  The  Economic  Freedom  of the  World  (EFW)  index  of Government  Enterprises  (II.a)
[Economic Freedom of the  World, Annual Report,  1997,  J.  Gwartney  and  R.  Lawson,
46Fraser Institute,  Ottawa]60.  This  index (available  at 5 years  intervals  since  1975)  ranks
countries  in  6 classes (0-10)  according to the following criteria  concerning  state owned
enterprises (SOEs):
SOEs value added >= 30% of (non agric. business) GDP, all sectors dominated by  0
SOEs
20% =<SOEs  value  added <  30%  of (non  agric.  business) GDP,  many  sectors  2
dominated  by SOEs, including manuf and retail
10%  =<SOEs  value  added  <  20%  of (non  agric.  business) GDP,  many  sectors  4
dominated by SOEs, including manufacturing
SOEs  value  added  <  10%  of (non  agric.  business)  GDP,  SOEs  in  network  6
industries and energy, many SOEs
SOEs  value  added  <  10%  of (non  agric.  business)  GDP,  SOEs  in  network  8
industries, but few SOEs
SOEs value added < 1% of (non agric. business) GDP  10
*  The  OECD Privatisation Database [partially  published  in  Financial  Market  Trends,
various  issues, OECD]  reports  number of sales  and  sale receipts  (including both  direct
and  indirect  privatisation  by  state  holding  companies  for  some  countries)  by  year.
Generally the data start when full-blown  privatisation programmes  are first implemented
(e.g.  early 90s for most countries,  earlier for a few of them). Privatisation  is defined  as
full or partial transfers of ownership.
*  The  EBRD privatisation  database  [as  reported  in the  EBRD Transition Report] reports
share  in  GDP  of privatisation  receipts  by  year  as  well  as  share  of private  sector  in
economic activity
*  The  database  on  SOEs by the Centre  Europeen  des Entreprises  a Participation  Publique
[Annales  CEEP,  Bruxelles,  various  issues]  reports  the  shares  in  (non  agricultural
business)  GDP of SOEs' value added,  employment and investment for the EU countries.
The index is available  at 3 years intervals since  1982.
The methodology for  constructing the public  ownership index  involved  several  steps. First,
the value of the EFW index in  1975  (which is available for all OECD countries)  is taken as a
starting point  for calculations.  Second, this starting  value  (PO 75 )  is checked  and  adjusted (if
needed)  using  more  detailed  information  coming  from  the  EBRD  and  CEEP  reports  and
OECD  country  desks;  such  adjustments  have  concerned:  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,
Finland, France, the Netherlands,  Korea, Turkey  and the United States.  The data on the share
of privatisation  receipts in GDP (St)  is used to create a new time-series of the SOEs role in the
economy (POt) according to the following rule:
POt = POt.1+0.2*St
Thus the EFW  index declines  by  2 points when  privatisation  receipts  account  for  10%  of
GDP. This  formula is  consistent with  EFWs original criterion  for ranking countries,  provided
the share of privatisation  receipts  in GDP is approximately  equal to the share in GDP of the
output of privatised firms.
'  A new  index has been made  available  in 2001  [Economic  Freedom of the  World,  Annual  Report,  2001,  J  Gwartney  and  R  Lawson, Fraser
Institute, Ottawa] based on the share of SOEs investment  instead of SOEs value added, but we chose  to rely on the old index to ensure consistency
with earlier work  and the supplementary  sources  used to construct the indicators (see below)
47Finally, PO was rescaled from least to most restrictive of private governance to be consistent
with the other indicators of regulation  and the indicator of privatisation was defined as the first
difference of PO.
1.5. Use of regulatory indicators in regressions
While  the economy-wide  and industry-level  indicators of regulation described  above  were
used  in the  descriptive  analysis  of Section  3,  the following  assumptions  and  simplifications
were made when these indicators were used in the econometric  analysis of Section 4:
- To  sharpen  the interpretation  of the empirical results,  the focus was  restricted  to  public
ownership/privatisation  and barriers to entry/entry liberalisation.
- Barriers  to  entry  were  netted  out  of the  market  structure  element  to  avoid  potential
endogeneity problems between regulation and MFP.
- Barriers to entry in the Hotels and Restaurants industry were  proxied  by economy-wide
administrative burdens.
- Barriers  to  entry  in  manufacturing  industries  were  assumed  to  consist of a  weighted
average  between  industry-specific  tariff and  non-tariff barriers  to trade  and  economy-
wide administrative burdens.
All indicators were rescaled from 0 to I (from  least to most restrictive) prior to estimation
2. THE CONSTRUCTION  OF MFP MEASURES  AND SENSITIVTY  OF RESULTS
2.1  Variables  used in the baseline MFP regressions
The  main  data-set  is  the  OECD  STAN  (2001  edition)  database.  More  details  on  the
construction  of the baseline variables used in the productivity analysis is provided in Scarpetta
and Tressel (2002).
The OECD databases include  information  on the capital stock.  However,  in  some  instances,
available  series are incomplete.  In such cases,  gross fixed capital  stock series were estimated
using the perpetual inventory method.
The labour  input is  based on  information  on employment  from  the OECD  STAN database.
These data were complemented  with  data on hours worked at the sectoral  level from the ILO
(LABORSTA)  for  the  following  countries:  Australia,  Austria,  Finland,  France,  Norway,
Portugal,  Spain,  Greece,  Italy,  Japan Netherlands  and New  Zealand.  For the  United  States,
data  are  from  the  BLS,  while those  for  Canada  are  from  the  Canadian  National  Statistics
Office.  For  the  remaining  countries  (e.g.  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Germany),  data  are  from
CRONOS. In order to minimise cross-country  differences  in total hours  worked,  industry data
were re-scaled  on the basis of available nation-wide  OECD data on hours worked.
The  construction  of the  human  capital  variable required  information  on relative  wages  by
skills. These  data  have a country  and an  industry  dimension,  but generally  refer to the early
1990s.  The  primary  source  of these  data  is the  OECD DEELSA  database  on  employment,
which,  in  turn,  is  based  on  the  European Structure of Earnings Survey (Eurostat)  for  EU
countries;  OECD  calculations  on  the  microdata  file  of the  outgoing  rotation  group  of the
Current Population Survey for the United  States; and Structure of Earnings  Surveys or Labour
Force Surveys  for  the  other  countries.  Data  on  wages  for  Portugal,  Netherlands,  Finland,
Norway, Germany, Australia and Japan were proxied with those in neighbouring countries.
48The construction of the human capital variable also requires data on the skill composition of
employment.  These data  have a country,  industry  and time dimension.  They are form  1) the
DEELSA  data  described  above;  2) the  skill data  in OECD STI  Working  Paper No.  1998/4;
and 3) ILO data on aggregate employment for the four skill categories.
Finally, the calculations  of MFP levels requires the use of comparative  product price  levels
across countries in order to convert the value of production to common units, while taking into
account  differences  in  the  purchasing  power  of each  country's  currency.  We  used  a  set
industry-specific  PPPs.  The  starting  point  of these  calculations  was  the  PPPs  for detailed
expenditure headings  from the United Nations International Comparisons Project (ICP). These
detailed PPPs were mapped  into the STAN classification  of industries by assigning each basic
expenditure  heading bought by consumers,  firms or the govemment to  its industry of origin.
When the basic heading includes products produced in more than one industry, the same price
was  assigned  to  all  the  industries  concemed.  Within  each  industry,  proxies  of the  product
prices  were  obtained  aggregating  the  basic  headings  with  the  corresponding  expenditure
shares.  However,  there  are  a  number  of problems  in  using  expenditure  PPPs  for  industry
productivity comparison.  In particular,  the presence of distribution and transportation margins,
indirect taxes and the inclusion/exclusion  of the prices of imported/exported  goods all tend to
create a gap  between  expenditure  prices and production  prices.  While available  data did  not
allow accounting  for distribution  and transportation margins, corrections  were made  for both
indirect taxes and international trade.
On the  basis of the methodology  described  in the main  text,  we calculated  MFP  levels  as
well as growth rates for each unit of observations  (country-industry  pair) in our sample. Table
A.6  presents  the  countries  with  the  highest  estimated  level  of MFP  in each  industry  at the
beginning and at the end of the sample period.
[A.6 Technology leaders on the basis of relative MFP levels,  1984,  1997]
2.2 Sensitivity analysis
In our empirical  analysis, we checked for the robustness  of results in different ways. First to
check  whether  the  empirical  links  between  productivity  and  regulations  are  robust,  we
experimented  with  different  indicators  of regulation,  entry  liberalisation  and  privatisation.
Moreover, as  discussed  in the main text, we  have identified,  by means of a by-now  standard
statistical procedure, a set of outlier observations that significantly affect the fit of the equation
or the estimated  coefficients and we removed them from the sample.  To test the importance of
their exclusion  from the sample we replicated our preferred productivity equations  on the full
sample (Table A.7). The results are broadly consistent with those in the equations presented  in
the  main  text  with  a  few exceptions.  In  particular,  the  estimated  coefficients  of the  MFP
growth of the leader countries for manufacturing  has is negative  and marginally significant (at
the  10 per cent level) in the equations of Table A.7, while  it was not statistically significant in
the equations of the main text. Moreover,  the inclusion of the outliers in the sample led to an
increase  in the  estimated  standard error of the human  capital variable  whose  coefficient  was
no longer statistically significant  in two of the three specifications.
[Table  A.7.  Sensitivity  of MFP  regressions:  preferred  specifications  without  control  for
outliers]
A third step in the sensitivity analysis was to check  for possible estimation problems related
to the presence of specific industries  in given countries that, because  of different technological
49features or  simply measurement  errors,  influence  significantly the overall  results.  To address
this issue, we ran rolling regressions  in which one unit of observation  (a country-industry pair)
is excluded at a time, and checked how the value and statistical significance of the coefficients
of the  regulatory  and  privatisation  variables  changed  across  regressions.  Figure  A.2  shows
how the statistical  significance of the coefficients  of the two preferred  specifications  (eq. 6  in
Table 6  and  eq.  3 in  Table  8)  varies  as the  sample  changes.  The  t-statistics  remain  largely
unaltered  corroborating  the results  discussed  in the  previous  section.  There  are,  however,  a
few  observations  that  significantly  affect  the  results.  In  particular,  the  significance  of
regulatory  coefficients  is  influenced  by  the  presence  in  the  sample  of some  concentrated
industries  in manufacturing  (e.g. coke and refined  petroleum, chemicals, basic metals), as well
some service  industries  (e.g. post and telecommunications, financial intermediation): in  both
cases  productivity  may  be  poorly  estimated  due  to  specific  market  conditions  and/or
difficulties in measuring output.6' Nevertheless,  we did not remove these unit of observations
from our sample  because none of them seemed to affect systematically all (or the majority of)
the regulatory coefficients and could thus be consider as an overall  outlier.62
[Figure A.2 Sensitivity analysis: T-statistics of estimated coefficients]
6  Our productivity  model  includes industry dummues  that capture common  (crosi-country)  industry-specific  technology  features  However,  our
mdustry breakdown  is fairly  aggregate and  possibly  not enough to  fully  charactenise  common (cross-country)  industry types, especially  for  small
countries that tend to be  specialised in specific marked niches in many manufacturing  and service industnes
6I  Moreover, it should be stressed that there were only two cases in which the removal of these units of observations turned an otherwise statistically
significant coefficient  (in both cases  only at the 10 per cent level) mto a statistically not significant  one
50Table A.1.  Indicator of administrative regulation:  basic components and aggregation  steps
Panel A. Administrative  reguladion
Start  ups of corporations  and  sole proprieorflnns
Mtninsnn nurnber of procedures  AdnuntStrative burdens  Admmnistrative burdens  Administranve
Mininmn number of services  on startups of  on startups of sole-  burdens on startups
corporations  propnetor finns
Maxurninn  delays (weeks)
Mmmnnn number direut  and indirect  costs (ECU)
AdmfnLstrativeprocedures
Use of tbe  silence is consent  rule  Licenses and perib
Existence of single contact points for  information on proedrs
Existence of  one-stop shops  for licenses  and notifications
Existence of systematic procedurs for disseminating  infonnation
Existence of policy requiring -plain language- drafing of  regulation
Right to appeal against adverse adnx  enforcement decisions
Existence of communication  at intemaional level
Existence of inquiry points on adTm  procedures for foreign parties
Adnunistrative
Goverunent policy concernng  regulatory quality assurance  Comnunication and  simplification  reguation
(such as tnsprncy/freedom of infornation)
Eistence of a complete count of the nunber of permits  Regulatory and
and licenses  required by national govenunent  administrative
Existence of an explicit progran to reduce administative burdens  opacity
Progrann  is underway to review and reduce the nunber of
licenses and pernuts required by national govenmnent
Roadfreight
License or prrnnt needed in order to operate a national business
Entry crtena based on cnteria other than technical, financial fitness or
public safety
Ent  regulations applv to transport for own account  Indusby-specific  bundens
Retail dLaribudon.:  food and dcothig
Registration proedures needed for startup
Notification procedures needed for startup
Licernse or permut needed for startup (not related  to outlet sing)
Siting license needed for start  (on top of zoning provisirtns)
51Table A.2. Subjective and objective measures  of economy-wide  product market
regulation, late 1990s
Panel A. Scores and Ranks
Nicoletti et al. (1999)  Kaufman et al. (1999)  Pryor (2002)
Scores  Ranks  Scores  Ranks  Scores  Ranks
Australia  0.24  3  0.30  8  0.40  12
Austria  0.49  8  0.37  10  0.39  11
Belgium  0.80  17  0.50  17  0.74  18
Canada  0.54  11  0.41  14  0.24  6
Denmark  0.50  9  0.19  7  0.38  10
Finland  0.67  14  0.08  5  0.00  1
France  0.88  18  0.60  18  0.78  19
Germany  0.52  10  0.39  11  0.31  7
Greece  0.97  20  0.74  19  1.00  21
Ireland  0.20  2  0.06  3  0.32  8
Italy  1.00  21  0.75  20  0.87  20
Japan  0.58  12  1.00  21  0.61  15
Netherlands  0.49  7  0.08  4  0.15  4
New Zealand  0.43  5  0.00  2  0.13  3
Norway  0.97  19  0.34  9  0.60  14
Portugal  0.70  15  0.39  12  0.65  17
Spain  0.64  13  0.42  15  0.58  13
Sweden  0.49  6  0.43  16  0.37  9
Switzerland  0.76  16  0.40  13  0.01  2
United Kingdom  0.00  1  0.00  1  0.16  5
United States  0.28  4  0.09  6  0.62  16
Panel B. Correlation coefficients (R)
Nicoletti et aL  (1999)  1.00  0.64*  0.55*
Kaufman etal. (1999)  1.00  0.67*
Pryor (2002)  1.00
Notes:
A high number indicates a greater degree of regulation and all indices are scaled from 0 to 1.
The original indices were, therefore, reversed (when necessary) and rescaled. The data come from
Nicoletti,  Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999), Pryor (2002) and Kaufman et aL  (1999).
For correlations  an asterisk designates  statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
Source: Nicoletti and Pryor (2002).
52Table A.3. Industry-level Indicators: sources and sample coverage
Industr1  ISIC  code  Peo  Industrial segments  Countries  Man soun
Industry  ~~~Revision  3  erodcovered  covered  Mi  ore
Manufacturng  15-37  1988.1993,1996  25  UNCTAD,  OECD
Electricity, gas and water  40_41  1998  23  OECD,  EC, PI,  WB
1998  24-25  OECD
Electfiaty  401  Prod., Trans,  Dist.
1975-1998  21  OECD,  EC, PI,  WS
Gas manufacture and distnbubon  402  1998  Prod,  Trans., Dist.  26  OECD,  EC, Pi, WS
1975-1998  21
Water works and supply  41  1998  23  OECD,  EC, PI, WB
Wholesale and Retal Trade, Hotels and  50_52  1998  25  OECD
Restaurants
Retail trade  52  1998  28  OECD
Transport and Storage  60_63  1998  21  EC, APC
1998  27
Ralhvays  601  1975-1998  Passenger, freight  21  OECD, ECMT
1998  27-29  OECD
Road frel ght  602
1975-1998  21  OECD, ECMT
Watertransport  61  1998  22  APC
1998  27  OECD
Air transport caniers  62  1975-1998  Passenger  21  OECD,EC
Supportng serwces to transport  63  1998  21  OECD
Post and telecommunlcatlons  64  1998  Mobile and y  26  OECD
telephony
Post  641  18  Lettr, parcel,  express  2C-29DEC.UPU
19751-1998  21
Telecommunicabons  642  Fixed, mobile  OECD
1975-1998  21
Financial Intermediation  65_67  1998  23  OECD,  APC
Finanaalinsbtuons  65  1998  23  OECD,  APC
ProfessIonal business services  74  1998  22  APC
Legal services  7411  1998  22  APC
Accountingsetwces  7412  1998  23  APC
Architectural and engineenfng  serwces  7421  1998  23  APC
Legend
ECMT = European  Conference of Ministers of Transportabon
EC  = Eumpean Commion
WS  = Wold Bank
Pi  = Pnvabsaton  Intemational
APC  = Australian Productity Commission
UPU  = Universal  Postal Union
53Table A.4. Industry-level  indicators:  coverage of regulatory areasI
Barriers  Public  MarAet  Vertical  Price  Conraints  Adninistraive  TradeorFDI
to entry  ownership  structure  integration  controls  burdens  restrictons
Airlines  X  X  X  X  X
Railways  j  X  - X  _  . X  X  i&  X
Road  1  X  1L_  x  x  x
Water transport  X  X  X
Gas  i  X  X
Water  X  X  X
Electricity  X  '2  ____
Post  i  )(  X  X  X
Telecommunications  X  X  *  X  X  X
Retail distribution  X  X  X  X
Financial services  X  X  X  X
Legal services  X  X  X
Accounting  services  X  X  X
Arcbitectural  and
engineering services  X  x  x
Manufacturing
I  All items refer to 1998. Items shaded in grey have a time-series dimension
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Food products, beverages and tobacco  1=  USA  CAN
20  JPN  USA
30  CAN  JPN
Texblas, textile products, leather and footwear  1  5  FRA  CAN
20  CAN  FRA
30  AUT  ITA
Wood and products ofwood and  corc  1  CAN  USA
20  USA  FIN
3'  GRC  NOR
Pulp paper,  paper products.  pnnting and publishing  7  - CAN  FRA
20  FRA  CAN
30  USA  ITA
Coke,  refined petroleum producs and nuclear fuel  1i  ITA  ITA
20  FRA  FIN
30  USA  USA
Chermcals  excluding pharmaceuticals  1"  FIN  FIN
20  BEL  FRA
30  GER  CAN
Pharmaceuticals  JPN  CAN
20  USA  NOR
30  NOR  GER
Rubber and plastics poducts  1i  AUT  ITA
20  DNK  FIN
30  ESP  USA
Other non-roetallic mineral pmducts  1'  CAN  CAN
20  AUT  FRA
30  BEL  USA
Basic metals  1'  NLD  FIN
2'  DNK  JPN
30  JPN  NOR
Fabricated  metal products except machinery  and equipment  CAN  USA
2'  BEL  FIN
30  GER  JPN
Machinery  and equipmnent  n  a c  1  CAN  FRA
20  GER  FIN
30  ONK  ITA
Electncal  and opUcal  equipment  AUS  FIN
20  DNK  JPN
30  JPN  FRA
Motor vehides trailers and semi-tralers  1'  USA  USA
20  GRC  FRA
30  CAN  FIN
Building and repairing  of ships and boats  FRA  EAN
20  USA  GER
3  ITA  NOR
Airraft and spacecraft  7a-  FRA  CAN
20  CAN  GER
30  GER  NLD
Railroad equipmrent and  transport  equipment  n a c  ITA  CAN
20  CAN  FIN
30  FRA  GBR
Manufactunng n e c, recycling  1r  CAN  FRA
2'  USA  USA
30  FIN  FIN
Wholesale  and reteil  trade,  repairs  IT-  ITA
20  BEL  CAN
30  USA  FRA
Hotels  and restaurants  i3tEL  USA
20  FRA  ITA
30  NOR  FRA
Transport arnd  storage  D  BEL  FRA
20  ITA  USA
30  FRA  CAN
Post and telecommunrcatons  1-  USA  FRA
20  CAN  USA
30  FRA  CAN
Financal Intermediation  NOR  ITA
2  ,  CAN  FRA
30  ITA  FIN
Real estate renting and business activities  P  AUS  USA
20  USA  FRA
30  SWE  NLD
Note  Date for Germany refer to westem Germany
Source  Scarpetta and Tresset (2002)
56Table A.7. Sensitivity of MFP regressions:  preferred specifications without control
foir outliers
Dependent variable.  AMFP  ,
prefered specificahons
eq. 4 Table 5  eq. 6  Table 6  eq. 3 TableS
Constant  *0.10  -0.13  -0.09
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.05)
AMFP Leader1i (MAN)  -0.02  -0.02 *  *0.01
(0.01)  (O  01)  (O  01)
AMFP  Leaderjt  (SERV)  0.10  0.10 - 0.08 -
(0.05)  (0 05)  (0.02)
Technology gap  (MAN)  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04
(0.006)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Technology gapijtj.  (SERV)  -0.05  -0.06  *0.06
(0 02)  (0.02)  (0.01)
Human capital ,I,  0.16  0.18  0.14
(0 13)  (0 13)  (0 08)
Barriers to entry (MAN) I  j  0.03
(002)
Barriers to entry (MAN)l  - Technology gap ljt.,  0.04
(0.02)
Bamiers to entry (SERV)  (non-comp)  ,i  0.04
(0 03)
Barriers to entry (SERV)  (comp) II  0.04
(0 03)
Barriers to entry (SERV)  (non-comp)  , - Technology gap 11.1 0.0
(0 06)
Baniers to entry (SERV)  (comp) l  *  Technology gap  jt-i  0.02
(0.02)
Entry liberalisabon  (SERV) I  -0.04
(O  01)
Regulation It (time-varying)  -(0.09)
(0 04)
Regulation I (time-varying) *  Technology gap I ,.,  .(0.OI)
(0 02)
Privabsabon  -0.25  -0.24
(o17  (0  10)
Number of observabons  3167  3167  3159
Reset  78.05  94.86  101.19
denotes significance at  the 1%  level, - at 5%  level;  at  10% level.
All equations include country, industry and tme dummies.
2.  Ramsey's omitted-vanable test  F-test on the joint significance of the additional terms
in a  model  augmented with the second, third and fourth powers of the predicted values
of  the original model
57Figure A.1.  A  map of indicators of regulation
(Indicators used In empirical analysis are highlighted In grey)
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58Figure A.2. So nsltivlty analysis  : T-statlstls of estimated coefficients
Panel A  Regldatory and privatisation variablt In equation 8  of table L
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